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Home Rule in an Era of Local
Environmental Innovation
Sarah Fox*
As 2016’s national election made clear, striking ideological differences
between cities and their surrounding states exist in many parts of the country.
One way in which this divide manifests itself is in state governments passing
laws with the sole purpose of outlawing particular local conduct. For instance,
recent state legislation has prohibited local governments from establishing a
minimum wage, from prohibiting the use of plastic bags, and from protecting
the rights of transgender individuals to use the bathroom of their identified
gender. These state actions do not create substantive law; instead, they merely
curtail the grant of authority—known as home rule—to municipalities.
State override of local action in this way undermines the ability of local
governments to address many kinds of harm. Local efforts to combat
environmental issues seem particularly vulnerable to obstruction by state
legislators. The trouble is, under traditional frameworks of state and local
government law, this kind of targeted removal of local authority is likely
justifiable. In consequence, legal scholarship on environmental localism has
generally conceded failure within the home rule framework and has looked
outside it for solutions to this problem. This Article explores whether
acceptance of defeat in the face of state prohibitions on particular exercises of
local environmental authority is warranted, and whether there is any path
forward for local environmental policy making within the traditional
framework.
Very generally, this Article proposes that elements of environmental law—
namely, state constitutional provisions and the public trust doctrine—may offer
a substantive basis for support of local authority in the face of targeted state
removals of authority. This Article uses the example of local plastic bag bans to
illustrate how the judiciary might employ these concepts. By making these
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z386D5PB0H
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elements part of the home rule analysis, courts may be able to provide some
protection against targeted removals of local authority.
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INTRODUCTION
The past several decades have seen cities,1 reinvigorated by increased
growth and political will, emerging as progressive forces in a number of areas.
The urban portfolio often includes measures focused on environmental
protection, and environmental advocates and scholars have been vocal in their
support for this new wave of local environmentalism.2 This trend has been
1. This Article uses “cities,” “localities,” and “local governments” interchangeably, and
encompasses local governments of various sizes and population characteristics. See Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 346–49 (1990) (discussing
the ways in which the term “city” can be used and construed in academic literature). While most of the
examples of the kinds of local action discussed come from major metropolitan areas, the analysis applies
equally to all subdivisions of the state.
2. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization of
Environmental Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 87, 106–07 (2012); John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The
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somewhat in tension with a rising division between state and local populations
on social issues. In a number of states, however, local legislation addressing
issues such as sexual orientation and gender, minimum wage, and
environmental protection has provoked state legislators to pass statutes that
explicitly remove certain policy options from local authority.3 These state
measures invalidate local laws passed, in most cases, pursuant to the localities’
home rule authority.
At first glance, the framework for distribution of state and local power in
the United States presents no barrier to this kind of state action. Localities have
historically operated under the umbrella of the state, and were vested with only
those powers specifically delegated to them.4 To loosen the strictures of this
approach, most states adopted home rule provisions throughout the twentieth
century. These provisions, although highly varied, were generally designed to
allow localities to solve urban issues creatively, and to avoid state
determination of local matters.5 The home rule doctrine therefore allocates to
localities a certain degree of authority. In all home rule states, however, that
power is generally subject to override by the state upon assertion of a state
interest, or the passage of general state legislation that conflicts with the local
measure.6
While the ability of the state to counteract local laws is very strong,
assertions of state power have at times received pushback from courts.7 This is
particularly true in cases involving certain categories of local legislation, or
impacts on constitutional rights.8 Such checks on state power constrain
legislative allocations of burdens and benefits, and highlight the limits of a
state’s ability to take back authority from localities. However, these decisions
do not apply well to state measures that bar local environmental action.9 The
mismatch between these approaches and environmental laws leaves local
control over environmental issues vulnerable to state authority. As a result, the
Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 399, 413 (2002); Shannon Roesler,
Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2015)
(“[E]nvironmental law scholars have also begun exploring the positive potential of local governance in
addressing a range of contemporary environmental problems.”); see also Paul Diller, Intrastate
Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1113–14 (2007).
3. See RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 87 (2016)
(“State legislatures have been aggressive in overruling local decisions with which they do not agree,”
including measures regarding predatory lending, minimum wage, bans on hydraulic fracturing, and antidiscrimination protections.).
4. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS: A PARTNERSHIP APPROACH 17 (2d ed.
1995).
5. GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 168 (4th ed.
2006).
6. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN
INNOVATION 61 (2008) (“All states . . . have one thing in common: nowhere does home rule give cities
local autonomy.”); see also infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part V.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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sphere of local autonomy carved out by home rule is particularly easy to
undermine in the environmental context.
There has been a growing conversation about the potential for local action
on environmental issues.10 There has also been much discussion of preemption
as it relates to local law making,11 and of the limitations on city authority in the
face of state action.12 These two camps have not yet been fully reconciled;
advocates for local action often fail to acknowledge the real limits on local
power under the home rule framework,13 while local government scholars tend
to accept those limits as inevitable.14 This Article attempts to bridge the gap
between these positions by acknowledging the constraints of home rule while
envisioning a way forward for local environmental laws.
A potential solution may come in the form of protections for the
environment that exist in some state constitutions and the public trust doctrine.
Where state constitutions protect a degree of environmental quality, that
constitutional value may not be undermined by state action.15 And even where
that right is not manifested in a specific constitutional guarantee, background
public trust principles may establish the state and its localities as custodians of
the environment for their citizens.16 Such principles could in turn inspire and
enable judges to push back on reactive targeting of local measures by the state
where the result is a net loss of environmental protection. This kind of judicial
skepticism of state action, while open ended in nature, is not unprecedented. As
noted, the Supreme Court and other courts have responded to a variety of
restrictive state actions that intrude on principles of local control or infringe on
constitutional rights with a similar defense of local experimentation in support

10. See, e.g., JOHN R. NOLON, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH LAND USE LAW:
STANDING GROUND 261–95 (2014); BRIAN STONE, JR., THE CITY AND THE COMING CLIMATE: CLIMATE
CHANGE IN THE PLACES WE LIVE 97–126 (2012); see generally SECTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOV’T
LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT: LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING
SUSTAINABILITY, EFFICIENCY, AND FISCAL SAVINGS (2012).
11. To the extent that state authority over categories of local environmental laws has been
discussed to date, it has generally occurred in the context of natural gas drilling, often through the lens
of implied preemption. Because of the unique state role in oil and gas production, hydraulic fracturing
(“fracking”) regulations at the local level may require a different kind of inquiry. For that reason, this
scholarship and case law, while contributing to a background understanding of state rejection of local
measures, are unlikely to be directly relevant. Similarly, this Article does not discuss issues of implied
preemption. At the core of this discussion is express preemption of local laws by state legislatures, and
the extent to which home rule does or could offer some checks on that kind of preemption.
12. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era
of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 987–89 (2007); Roesler, supra note 2, at 1155–72 (exploring
the potential for federal authority to be exercised in support of local laws).
13. See, e.g., FRUG & BARRON, supra note 6, at ix–xiii (describing reasons why cities may not
have the power to address traffic issues in certain ways, despite a mandate from the public).
14. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS 19 (1999) (noting that “[c]ity powerlessness appears to be an inevitable . . . feature of modern
life”).
15. See infra Part V.C.1.
16. See infra Part V.C.2.
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of citizens’ rights.17 This Article suggests ways in which judges could similarly
apply environmental protections and principles in evaluating state action.
Certainly, there are many debates to be had about the merits of home rule
and the decision maker best suited to make policy for various topics. The
trouble with advocating for power on the part of one level of government over
another is that such arguments may be susceptible to shortsighted positions for
the sake of an ideological victory. However, substantive principles located in
state constitutional provisions and the public trust doctrine may be able to offer
an environmental lodestar for state and local governments alike.
Today, given the political realities of the country, and given that
innovative environmental protections may currently be more likely to occur at
the local level than at any other, preserving a way forward for local
environmental action is important. The authority of states to dismantle local
environmental policies through targeted prohibitions will have potentially farreaching consequences. If cities are to continue leading on climate change
adaptation and mitigation, transportation initiatives, pollution reduction, and
many other issues, the prospect of piecemeal state preemption is alarming.
Modifying the lens through which state revocation of local powers is viewed
will advance the interests of cities in making environmental progress at the
local level.
Part I of the Article addresses recent trends toward local environmental
policy making. Part II discusses the contours of home rule authority and the
power dynamic between state and local governments. Part III provides
examples of how state preemption of local environmental action might be
effected under this framework, looking in particular at statewide bans on local
plastic bag ordinances. Part IV provides an example of how the established
home rule analysis is likely to play out in the case of local bans on plastic bags
and state efforts to prohibit those local policies. Part V offers a description of
some exceptions to the typical home rule framework, and discusses why those
exceptions tend not to apply to the environmental context. This discussion
suggests, however, that courts may be able to rely on other means, including
underlying principles of state constitutional or common law, to provide for
greater protection of local governments in the face of reactive, piecemeal state
legislation targeting local environmental measures. Finally, Part VI illustrates
how those new strategies might be applied to the plastic bag ban context, and to
achieving a different outcome in the face of state prohibitions on these bans.
I. CITIES AND PROGRESSIVE POLITICS
The past several decades in the United States have seen a revitalization of
the urban core in many cities around the country.18 These changes have
17.
18.

See infra Part V.B.
See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Rebirth of the Neighborhood, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1595,
1595 (2013) (recounting Washington, D.C.’s population growth after years of population decline and
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resulted in shifts in political and cultural spheres.19 Following the suburban
boom of the 1950s and 1960s, and the ensuing urban fiscal and law
enforcement problems of the 1970s and 1980s,20 a number of cities have seen a
resurgence in activity and population. These revitalized cities are generally
accompanied by new and desirable real estate, investment, and employment
opportunities. Along with this growth has come increased local political will
from populations that are often more progressive than their less urban
counterparts.21 Invested with the funding and political capital needed to
advance major initiatives, local authorities are acting on a number of issues.
Local law making can act as a “catalyst for change,”22 address a range of
problems because of its flexible nature,23 and overcome barriers to progress
faced at the state or national level.24 The sheer number of local governments
makes them an important force; “if the fifty states are laboratories for public
policy formation, then surely the 3000 counties and 15,000 municipalities
provide logarithmically more opportunities for innovation, experimentation,
and reform.”25
Environmental issues are one area in which the trend toward local policy
making has been taking hold. “[C]ities have been at the forefront of
environmental activism for a long time,”26 and have long innovated with regard

highlighting Boston, San Diego, Seattle, and Miami’s “renewed investment in residential, retail, and
business real estate”).
19. Cf. Parag Khanna, Opinion, A New Map for America, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/opinion/sunday/a-new-map-for-america.html?_r=0 (positing that
America is “headed toward a metropolis-first arrangement”).
20. For a general description of these issues, see, for example, Gideon Kanner, Detroit and the
Decline of Urban America, 2013 MICH ST. L. REV. 1547, 1549–52 (2013).
21. See, e.g., Josh Kron, Red State, Blue City: How the Urban-Rural Divide Is Splitting America,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/red-state-blue-cityhow-the-urban-rural-divide-is-splitting-america/265686/ (noting that “virtually every major city
(100,000-plus population) in the United States of America has a different outlook from the less populous
areas that are closest to it”).
22. Diller, supra note 2, at 1113.
23. See, e.g., Nolon, supra note 2, at 399 (explaining Colorado’s Local Government Land Use
Control Enabling Act and its goal to achieve “orderly land development within the state that maintains a
balance between the basic human needs of its changing population and ‘legitimate environmental
concerns’”).
24. See Krakoff, supra note 2, at 107–08 (“In smaller communities, affinities of value, politics,
and culture can overcome the epistemological and psychological barriers that inhibit the public at
large.”).
25. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 259 (2004).
This view of local innovation is, however, not uncontested. See generally Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy,
Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333,
1398 (2009) (concluding, after empirical study, that local government may produce a lower than optimal
level of innovation).
26. DORCETA E. TAYLOR, THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE PEOPLE IN AMERICAN CITIES, 1600S–
1900S: DISORDER, INEQUALITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 502 (2009) (describing efforts by cities over
several centuries focused on issues such as clean water, clean air, waste disposal, preservation of open
space, and others).
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to local solutions to environmental problems.27 And with the recent rise in city
populations and increased political activism, local governments have taken the
lead on environmental policy making, including transit and development
strategies, climate mitigation and adaptation, toxics reform, and other
subjects.28 As cities grow, ecological challenges become intertwined with
urban problems, and the development of more sustainable cities is essential.29
The call for local power over environmental issues is not necessarily an
intuitive one. Scholars have often decried local decision making over
environmental issues as unsound policy, given cities’ at times parochial
conduct.30 Externalities inherent in many environmental problems have led
many to advocate for centralized decision making—to nationalize, or even
internationalize, environmental policy.31 Greater resources and expertise at
higher levels of government may also make environmental law making more
successful.32 Nevertheless, there exist environmental issues of uniquely local
impact and importance.33 Moreover, given the current political climate,
localities may be the only realistic option for pursuing environmental
solutions,34 and “local, multi-stakeholder involvement in environmental

27.
28.

IAN DOUGLAS, CITIES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 305–07 (2013).
Roesler, supra note 2, at 1113; see also Krakoff, supra note 2, at 89 (“Local food, local work,
local energy production—all are hallmarks of a resurgence of localism throughout contemporary
environmental thought and action.”); Nolon, supra note 2, at 365 (noting a “remarkable and unnoticed
trend among local governments to adopt laws that protect natural resources”).
29. See, e.g., GREEN CITIES: AN A-TO-Z GUIDE 1–3 (2010); see also JANETTE SADIK-KHAN &
SETH SOLOMONOW, STREET FIGHT: HANDBOOK FOR AN URBAN REVOLUTION 24 (2016) (noting that the
national urban population is expected to grow by 100 million people by 2050, and that “[a]dding a
population nearly the equivalent of the nation’s four largest states to cities and their suburbs could easily
exhaust their [ability to provide services to their populations] . . . . [T]o attract, retain, and accommodate
rising populations, our leaders must rapidly implement strategies that make cities more attractive places
to live while making their infrastructure function more efficiently to meet the growing demand.”).
30. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2259–63 (2003)
[hereinafter Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule]; David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of
Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 488–89 (1999) [hereinafter Barron, The Promise of
Cooley’s City]; Jim Rossi, “Maladaptive” Federalism: The Structural Barriers to Coordination of State
Sustainability Initiatives, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1759, 1762–64 (2014) (noting that local innovation
and control can be suboptimal where it fails to account for coordination benefits). Recent developments
in urban dynamics make these predictions less likely, however, and inform the position that on balance,
vesting some power in local governments to make environmentally protective laws is warranted.
31. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate
Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007) (arguing that subnational action on climate change is
ineffective at best, and harmful at worst).
32. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, Local Climate Change Law, in LOCAL CLIMATE CHANGE
LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CITIES AND OTHER LOCALITIES 3, 15 (2012).
33. Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis,
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 244 (2000) (noting that the decentralization of authority over
environmental issues “may be an appropriate response to the fact that environmental problems often
tend to be place-specific”).
34. See Rossi, supra note 30, at 1761 (theorizing that the trend toward local environmental
governance is best explained by “simple pragmatism,” given the relative ease of passing laws at the
local level than at the state or federal levels).
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decision making [may be] key to effecting better environmental results.”35
Motivated by these trends, environmental law scholars and policy makers alike
have started to explore “the positive potential of local governance in addressing
a range of contemporary environmental problems.”36
These urban environmental measures take a variety of forms, address a
variety of topics, and occur in cities both large and small. For example, trash
collection and recycling have long been in the purview of local governments.37
As urban populations increase, and available land for trash disposal becomes
scarce, the need to reduce trash flow and improve recycling efforts becomes
clear.38 In response, a number of localities have developed waste reduction or
recycling programs as part of their sustainability portfolios.39 Some of these
efforts have taken the form of bans or fees on plastic bags, Styrofoam, and
other forms of disposable packaging.40 Such local initiatives may help to
reduce the impact of plastic bags on the environment and on municipal garbage
and recycling processes.41 They may also serve as a gateway into broader

35.

WILLIAM A. SHUTKIN, THE LAND THAT COULD BE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND DEMOCRACY
109 (2000).
36. Roesler, supra note 2, at 1113.
37. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 354 (2007) (“[W]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function.”); see
also 7 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 24:246 (3d ed.) (“Municipal corporations ordinarily may cause,
regulate, or directly perform the collection and disposal of garbage and refuse within their areas.”);
Douglas, supra note 27, at 163–81 (describing the history of local measures regarding waste disposal
and recycling, from the 1900s to present).
38. See, e.g., JOAN MULLANY, POPPING THE PLASTICS QUESTION: PLASTICS RECYCLING AND
BANS ON PLASTICS—CONTACTS, RESOURCES AND LEGISLATION 2 (1990) (noting that “[t]he
management and disposal of municipal solid waste has become one of the foremost issues facing local
elected officials over the past decade and unfortunately, promises to continue to demand their attention
through the end of this century”); Megan Backsen & Jack Hornickel, Cradle-to-Cradle: The Elimination
of Waste Introduction, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 572, 572 (2015) (“Academics and governments alike
continue to view the steady accumulation of garbage as a threat to orderly life.”).
39. See, e.g., SUSTAINABLE SANTA FE COMM’N, SUSTAINABLE SANTA FE PLAN: BUILDING A
MORE SUSTAINABLE FUTURE BY LOOKING TO THE PAST 25–27 (2008), http://www.santafenm.gov/
media/files/Public_Utilities_Environmental_Services/SustainableSFweb.pdf (describing waste reduction
and recycling efforts by Santa Fe); CITY OF CLEVELAND OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY, Zero Waste,
CLEVELAND, http://www.city.cleveland.oh.us/CityofCleveland/Home/Government/CityAgencies/Office
OfSustainability/WasteReductionAndRecycling (last visited July 16, 2017) (“The City saves money and
natural resources by decreasing the waste generated through its own operations and within the larger city
limits. This includes both residential and commercial waste reduction and recycling programs. The City
diverts thousands of tons of waste from the landfill each year, saving over $1 million annually through
waste disposal cost avoidance and recycling revenue.”); Anna Clark, Creative Ways Cities Are Pushing
Recycling, NEXTCITY (Sept. 2, 2014), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/how-to-get-people-to-recyclecreative-ways (describing recycling initiatives in Houston and Detroit).
40. See, e.g., Stephen Maxwell Reck, The Expanding Environmental Consciousness of Local
Government: Municipalities That Have Banned Styrofoam and the Legal Consequences, 11 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 127, 127 (1990) (listing cities with bans on Styrofoam packaging).
41. See Adam Sternbergh, The Fight Over Plastic Bags is About a Lot More Than How to Get
Groceries Home, N.Y. MAG. (July 15, 2015), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/07/plastic-bagbans.html.
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
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environmental engagement for communities.42 To achieve these goals, cities
will likely need to employ bans or surcharges on bag use.
Cities are also on the front lines of climate change. Cities may be “both a
cause and a solution to global warming.”43 That is, cities account for a greatly
disproportionate percentage of greenhouse gas emissions, and as city
populations increase, emissions will follow.44 But cities may also be able to
employ a variety of strategies that can help to reduce emissions, and to address
issues of sea level rise, energy efficiency, urban resiliency, water use, and
others. A number of cities have realized that long-term planning will be
required in order to prepare for these changes,45 and have begun to develop
policies accordingly.46 For example, many local governments are involved in
siting renewable energy projects, offering financial incentives to encourage
development of renewable energy sources, promoting interconnection to the
grid to allow consumers to profit from generation of their own renewable
energy, and establishing local renewable portfolio standards that require a
certain percentage of city power to be purchased from renewable sources.47
Cities have engaged in development of adaptation strategies to handle
phenomena like sea-level rise.48 In 2007, New York City developed the first
draft of its PlaNYC portfolio of sustainability measures. That plan is designed
to make the city more resilient in the face of climate change and rising sea
levels by strengthening coastline defenses, creating building standards that will
better protect the built environment against severe weather, and improving
urban infrastructure.49 New York updated PlaNYC after the damage wrought
on the city in 2012 by Hurricane Sandy made even more apparent the potential

42. Carolyn Flower, Banning the Bag, Greening the City, NEXTCITY (July 12, 2012),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/banning-the-bag-greening-the-city.
43. Green Cities: Mayoral Initiatives to Reduce Global Warming Pollution: Hearing Before the
H. Select Comm. on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 110th Cong. 1 (June 19, 2007); see
also Patricia E. Salkin, Can You Hear Me Up There? Giving Voice to Local Communities Imperative for
Achieving Sustainability, 4 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 256, 258 (2009) (“[V]oices and actions of
local governments are critical to achieving truly sustainable communities, especially in the climate
change arena.”).
44. Green Cities: Mayoral Initiatives to Reduce Global Warming Pollution: Hearing Before the
H. Select Comm. on Energy Indep. & Glob. Warming, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (2007) (statement of
Rep. Edward J. Markey, Jr., Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Energy Indep. & Glob. Warming).
45. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 10, at 96 (noting the need for cities to “fundamentally remake
themselves to remain viable enterprises” in advance of further shifts in climate).
46. See, e.g., Edward Hart, 8 Creative Ways Cities are Combating Rising Temperatures, N.Y.
MAG. (June 15, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/06/how-cities-arecombating-rising-temperatures.html.
47. See, e.g., Jessica Reinhardt, Greening the Grid, in GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra
note 10, at 193–209.
48. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 32, at 7 (“Climate adaptation is innately suited to response at
a local level.”).
49. N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFF. OF RECOVERY & RESILIENCY, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/orr/
index.page (last visited July 16, 2017).
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dangers of extreme weather and rising seas.50 Localities across the country are
developing their own adaptation plans and policies to address the coming
changes.51 These plans require authority on the part of localities over a wide
array of property, utilities, and many other aspects of local governance.
Finally, transit policy has long shaped cities, for better and for worse. The
massive highway projects of the mid-twentieth century had lasting impacts on
cities by bifurcating neighborhoods and providing a quick conduit in and out of
urban areas. Many cities abandoned mass transit long ago in favor of the car.
Tied to that new preference, mandatory parking lots began to cover much of the
urban landscape.52 As more people moved back into cities, and cities became
increasingly interested in more efficient use of land and improvements in air
quality, local governments paid increased attention to transit policies.53
A renewed focus on transit can have profound benefits for urban life,54 as
well as for the environment.55 The interest of cities in tackling the
transportation needs of their citizens for the coming years can be seen in many
ways. For instance, many cities competed in the United States Department of
Transportation’s Smart City Challenge,56 which offered a $40 million grant to
help integrate new technology, such as self-driving cars, into urban
transportation infrastructure.57 Across the country, cities of various sizes and
demographics, such as Kansas City,58 Los Angeles,59 Columbus,60

50. See generally CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC: A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK 1–
2 (2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/resiliency/sandy_after_3_years.shtml.
51. See generally State and Local Adaptation Plans, GEO. CLIMATE CTR., http://www.
georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/plans.html (last visited July 16, 2017) (providing a comprehensive set
of links to local climate adaptation plans around the country).
52. DONALD SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING 111 (2011) (summarizing studies that
show that parking requirements create underused parking lots in cities).
53. See David S. Silverman & Brent O. Denzin, Green Transportation: Roadblocks and Avenues
for Promoting Low-Impact Transportation Choices, in GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 10,
at 159.
54. VUKAN R. VUCHIC, TRANSPORTATION FOR LIVABLE CITIES 7 (Center for Urban Policy
Research: Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 1999) (“A number of elements comprising
livability of an area depend, directly or indirectly, on the type and quality of its transportation system.”).
55. E.g., Phillip A. Hummel, Next Stop - A Cleaner and Healthier Environment: Global
Strategies to Promote Public Transit, 35 TRANSP. L.J. 263, 263 (2008) (“Transportation demands and
environmental concerns are inextricably linked.”).
56. Smart City Challenge, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/smartcity (last
updated June 29, 2017).
57. Id.
58. Press Release, City of Kansas City, Kansas City Announces Opening Date of KC Streetcar,
http://kcmo.gov/streetcar/opening-date-of-kc-streetcar/ (last visited July 16, 2017).
59. See, e.g., SADIK-KHAN & SOLOMONOW, supra note 29, at 68–69.
60. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., U.S. Department of Transportation Announces
Columbus as Winner of Unprecedented $40 Million Smart City Challenge (June 23, 2016),
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-department-transportation-announces-columbuswinner-unprecedented-40-million-smart (describing plans to use transportation technology to link parts
of the city).
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Providence,61 and many others, are also using new transit policies to convert
urban areas shaped by decades of focus on suburbs, highways, and the personal
automobile into those that can better serve their newly invigorated urban cores.
To do that, however, they must have some control over property for use in
transit, the ability to raise needed funds, and the freedom to adjust street and
traffic codes,62 among other powers.
These are merely a handful of examples of local environmental problems
and solutions that occur outside the broader network of state and federal
environmental regulations. But they are critical to the health of cities, and to the
ability of urban areas to adjust to shifting demands. Cities are likely to play an
important role in any blueprint for a sustainable future. Therefore, it is critical
to clarify the relationship between local power to implement environmental
protections and state intrusions upon that power. The next Part considers the
interplay between state and local actors.
II. THE STATE AND LOCAL RELATIONSHIP
The rise in urban power has been accompanied by a growing number of
substantive policy conflicts between states and localities. Generally speaking,
local governments operate under powers delegated to them by state
governments. The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution says
that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”63 The lack of mention of local governments in the Constitution has
generally been interpreted to mean that localities’ sole authority derives from
the states.64 As described in greater detail below, the shape of power conferred
upon local governments has changed over the nation’s history. Today, localities
in most states have some independent sphere of authority within which they can
act without express permission from or action by the state. While operating
under those delegated powers, however,65 localities “sometimes seek to pass
laws and regulations that go beyond what their respective state governments
desire.”66 In many instances and in many different fields, this has resulted in
state governments acting to remove specific policy outcomes or subject areas
from local control via preemption, or in the explicit removal of certain aspects

61. Press Release, City of Providence: Mayor Jorge O. Elorza, Enhanced Transit Corridor in
Downtown Providence (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.providenceri.com/mayor/enhanced-transitcorridor-in-downtown-providence.
62. See, e.g., SADIK-KHAN & SOLOMONOW, supra note 29, at 30–31(describing adoption of new
urban street design guides).
63. U.S. CONST., amend. X.
64. See, e.g., FRUG & BARRON, supra note 6, at 2 (“Local power in the United States is derived
from state law. Unless states authorize their local governments to do something, they have no power to
do it.”); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4, at 2.
65. Nolon, supra note 2, at 365.
66. Roesler, supra note 2, at 1115.
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of home rule authority from local governments. Understanding this dynamic is
important for an appreciation of the functional power that cities have to effect
change at the local level.67 Subpart A provides a summary of the origins and
evolution of the home rule doctrine in local government law. Subpart B further
analyzes the differences between the constitutional and statutory bases for this
local authority.
A. The Evolution of Home Rule
Today, the relationship between state and local governments is controlled
in large part by grants of home rule authority, which allocate certain powers to
localities from the state. The home rule doctrine emerged as a result of local
governments pushing for greater autonomy. The long history of local selfgovernance in the United States,68 however, has never meant local
independence. While a thorough recounting of state and local relations has been
discussed in detail elsewhere69 and is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief
description of the relationship will provide some context for the ensuing
discussion. Local independence from the monarchy was a fiercely asserted
right in seventeenth-century England.70 And in colonial America, local
governance was the first kind of recognized authority.71 The political status of
early American cities, however, was not entirely settled. In post-revolutionary
America, the question of how best to think about the authority of local
governments occupied courts for much of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, and has continued to be the subject of much debate.72
While the American political structure has always varied from that of
England, American courts seem to have imported the British tradition of
thinking of cities as “corporate entit[ies] intermediate between the state and the
individual.”73 As a result, “the legal system in America formulated the rights of
cities in the process of establishing the general relationship between
corporations and the state.”74 Until the early nineteenth century, American
courts tended to treat cities and private corporations in the same way, and these
entities often had similar powers.75 Then, in 1819, the United States Supreme
67. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government:
The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 152 (1986).
68. See John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of State-Interests in
Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497, 506 (1993).
69. See, e.g., FRUG, supra note 14, at 26–53 (providing detailed discussion of the legal history of
cities).
70. Id. at 34–35.
71. DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 8 (2001).
72. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4, at 17 (“The most desirable degree to which political power should
be decentralized by a state government to local governments has been a source of major controversy
since the end of the Revolutionary War.”).
73. FRUG, supra note 14, at 26.
74. Id. at 27.
75. Id. at 40.
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Court issued its seminal decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward.76 Trustees of Dartmouth College created a formal distinction
between private and public corporations.77 The former, as the province of
private citizens, had property rights that had to be protected against state
intrusion; the latter, founded by the government, required no such protection.78
Following that decision, an early treatise developed a theory that “public
corporations . . . are invested with subordinate legislative powers . . . and such
powers are subject to the control of the legislature of the state.”79 The
characterization of cities as public corporations subordinate to the state became
widespread, retaining protections against state intrusion only for private
property.80 This shift, which ran contrary to much of the history of state and
local relations, “turned the political world as it then existed upside down.”81
For some time, this theory of local subordination to state control went
untested. An increase in city functions during the mid-nineteenth century,
however, prompted new debates over the proper relationship of city to state.
Judge Thomas M. Cooley advanced one early theory of how best to allocate
power between the two entities. In an 1868 treatise, Judge Cooley stated that
“the sovereign people had delegated only part of their sovereignty to the
states,” and had “preserved the remainder for themselves in written and
unwritten constitutional limitations on governmental actions.”82 One of those
important limitations was “the people’s right to local self-government.”83
Not long thereafter, an 1872 treatise by Judge John F. Dillon developed a
competing formulation directly contrary to Cooley’s position. Dillon argued
that democratic goals of governance and avoidance of special interests were
best accomplished through state legislative control of cities.84 He stated this
view in broad terms by noting that state power “is supreme and transcendent: it
may erect, change, divide, and even abolish, at pleasure, as it deems the public
good to require,” and that courts have a duty to require local governments to
“show a plain and clear grant for the authority they assume to exercise.”85
Dillon’s views appear to have been based on an “expectation that state and
judicial control would help ensure the attainment by cities of an unselfish
public good,”86 as well as on his own ties to corporate actors interested in state

76.
77.
78.
79.
(1836)).
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
See Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City, supra note 30, at 498–505.
See FRUG, supra note 14, at 41.
KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 8–9 (citing James Kent, Commentaries on American Law
FRUG, supra note 14, at 42.
Id. at 43.
Williams, supra note 67, at 88.
Id.
FRUG, supra note 14, at 46–47.
Id. at 47.
Id.
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control.87 “Dillon’s Rule” was eventually adopted nationwide, possibly
motivated by negative views of cities that painted them as “the home of mobs,
foreigners, racial minorities, and sinners,”88 a threat to national unity,89 and
“islands of private parochialism.”90 Its broad acceptance meant that localities
could operate pursuant only to specific grants of power from the state
legislature. The rule did not dictate how much power should be delegated to
localities, but it vested the source of that power squarely with the state.91
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, localities were heavily
dependent on the states. Local governments could take no action on any issue
without an explicit grant of authority from the state legislature. The inherent
limitations of this approach became apparent during the late 1800s and early
1900s, as cities began to expand rapidly for the first time in the United States.
That growth was simultaneous with a rise in influence of local delegates at the
state level, who engaged in widespread abuse of power that culminated in an
“explosion of ‘local privilege’ or ‘special privilege’ legislation and the general
practice of enacting innumerable and detailed state laws on every aspect of
local government activity.”92 Concern about this interference in local affairs
led to a call for increased power at the local level, a push that was reinforced by
the Progressive movement for more businesslike government at the turn of the
twentieth century.93 It became increasingly clear that cities faced a number of
unique problems, and that state legislatures were not well positioned to act
swiftly or knowledgeably on these issues.
Out of these conditions came an idea of governance known as “home
rule.” As a general idea, home rule was intended to establish a sphere within
which cities could act on their own initiative, without specific grants of
authority. Home rule provides, in short, a “legal means to decentralize power to
the local level.”94 Advocates for home rule were motivated by “a Progressive
era concern with the limited scope and capacity of municipal governments in
the state constitutional system.”95 Home rule was also designed to combat the
dangers of state control that had been evidenced in targeted special legislation,

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Williams, supra note 67, at 91–99, 148–49.
KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 9.
FRUG, supra note 14, at 43–44.
Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City, supra note 30, at 488.
See KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 10.
Id. at 11; see also SCHRAGGER, supra note 3, at 63 (noting that “[h]ome rule was not an effort
to shift power to the representatives of the local government; it was oftentimes instead an effort to limit
the law-making role of the city’s state legislative delegation, which was (according to reformers)
responding too readily to every costly demand of their urban constituents”).
93. KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 11; see also SCHRAGGER, supra note 3, at 64 (“These
reforms were of a piece with the Progressive Era emphasis on technical and expert administration, data
collection, and efficiency.”).
94. Briffault, supra note 25, at 260.
95. Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86
DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2009).
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which interfered with appropriate city governance.96 Thus, the two underlying
goals of the home rule movement were (1) to give cities a degree of initiative in
city affairs based on a more general grant of authority from the state, and (2) to
“give cities an area of autonomy immune from state control, even by general
legislation.”97 “In contrast to a Dillon’s Rule regime that presumes city
powerlessness, home rule provides presumptive city authority to engage in a
wide variety of governmental activities.”98 Early conceptions of home rule took
a variety of forms and justifications,99 and may have been motivated more by
the cause of “good government” than by local independence for its own
sake.100 At a basic level, however, these ideas incorporated some of Thomas
Cooley’s ideas of local power and independence.101 Running through all of
these home rule proposals was an understanding of the importance of local
decision making, secure from state authority, to allow improved visions of city
government to take shape.
In 1875, Missouri became the first state to include a home rule provision
in its constitution,102 and many others followed.103 Today, nearly all states
have something akin to home rule, although grants of local power take many
forms.104 Most broadly, home rule provisions come in either constitutional or
statutory form.105 The constitutional home rule framework predominated at the
turn of the twentieth century. Under this scheme, the state constitution carves
out a sphere of local authority, free of state interference over matters of local
significance.106 Because of difficulties in defining the local sphere, state
96.
97.

FRUG & BARRON, supra note 6, at 37.
FRUG ET AL., supra note 5, at 168; see also Brian W. Ohm, Some Modern Day Musings on the
Police Power, 47 URB. LAW. 625, 636 (2015) (noting “[t]he home rule movement resulted in
amendments to state constitutions and statutory changes that granted local governments some level of
autonomy over certain local issues”); COMM. ON THE N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTION, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE 6 (2016) (“Beginning in the 19th
Century, the home rule movement represented a determined effort to provide local governments with
autonomy over local affairs and freedom from State legislative interference.”).
98. Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1134 (2012).
99. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 30, at 2292–2320 (presenting three distinct
visions of home rule that may have existed among its early proponents: the “old conservative city,”
which sought to restore city governance to a smaller scale, and to narrow the authority of both the local
and state governments; the “administrative city,” which sought to legitimize the exercise of a range of
powers at the local level; and the “social city,” which sought to emphasize and support the public and
political nature of the cities and secure freedom for local governments to undertake the kinds of big
projects needed to support its public purposes).
100. Id. at 2291.
101. Ohm, supra note 97, at 636.
102. FRUG ET AL., supra note 5, at 169.
103. KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 11 (listing states that followed Missouri in adding positive
grants of authority to municipalities, including California, Washington State, Minnesota, Colorado,
Virginia, Oregon, Oklahoma, Michigan, Arizona, Ohio, Nebraska, and Texas).
104. See id. at 14; see also Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U.
COLO. L. REV. 927, 944 (2015) (noting the “diversity and distribution of shared governance structures
that obtain under the umbrella term ‘home rule’”).
105. Weiland, supra note 33, at 263.
106. See Diller, supra note 2, at 1125.
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legislatures began to shift in the mid-twentieth century to statutory grants that
gave localities a certain degree of authority, provided that the exercise of local
power did not conflict with any state laws.107 While scholars have found it
difficult to calculate with precision the number of constitutional versus
legislative home rule states, the majority of states now employ the legislative
approach.108 For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to say that under any
system, the most relevant inquiries for the home rule framework when it comes
to state override of local authority are the extent of the state versus local
interest and the existence of “general” versus “special” conflicting state
laws.109
Certainly, the grant of home rule powers to cities around the country did
not result in their independence. While “local governments [may] have gained
some measure of power and formal autonomy in the state-local
relationship,”110 they remain largely subject to the control of the state
legislature.111 But the various home rule provisions did result in the conferral
of a certain range of powers upon localities under which they could operate.112
This power encompasses both self-governance and police powers,113 the latter
of which includes the authority to address environmental harms.114 Vesting
local governments with this sphere of authority reflected the broader goals of
providing greater freedom to local governments,115 eliminating particularized
107. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4, at 29–34 (explaining this legislative, or “devolution of powers,”
approach, and citing state statutes including those of Wisconsin, Oregon, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts that have adopted versions of this doctrine).
108. Diller, supra note 2, at 1126–27 n.65 (discussing differences in calculating numbers of home
rule states in the work of leading scholars).
109. See infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
110. Davidson, supra note 12, at 977.
111. RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 235–36
(6th ed. 2004) (“Absent any specific limitation in the state constitution, the state can amend, abridge or
retract any power it has delegated, much as it can impose new duties or take away old privileges.”).
112. Weiland, supra note 33, at 264–65.
113. See, e.g., Ross Crow, Municipal Regulation of Groundwater and Takings, 44 TEX. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 24 (2014) (citing Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 891 (Ct. App. 1994) for
the proposition that the city or county has “police power equal to that of the state so long as the local
regulations do not conflict with general laws”). Exercise of police power versus home rule authority may
have implications for how and when a local law is preempted by state action. See, e.g., Cleveland v.
State, 942 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio 2010) (“Traditionally, we have used a three-part test to evaluate
conflicts under the Home Rule Amendment. A state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance
when (1) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, (2) the
statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
114. See, e.g., Kristen van de Biezenbos, Where Oil is King, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1631, 1659
(2017) (“The incorporation of state environmental laws at the local level is one way in which
municipalities can exercise their police power to protect citizens where they cannot directly regulate oil
and gas.”); Michelle Bryan Mudd, A “Constant and Difficult Task”: Making Local Land Use Decisions
in States with a Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5–6 (2011)
(noting that in the 1970s, “courts began ruling that local governments had implied authority to regulate
environmental harms under their existing police powers”).
115. See Ohm, supra note 97, at 636.
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state control over localities,116 and creating greater accountability in the state
legislature for the relationship between state and local governments.117
B. Home Rule Analysis
As noted, the extent of state powers varies under different home rule
frameworks. While there may be as many formulations of home rule as there
are states that employ it,118 it can be broken down generally into two
categories: home rule powers created by state constitution and those created by
statute. Under either framework, state legislators seeking to preempt local
action have a great deal of authority to do so.
1. Constitutional Grants and State Interest
Early state constitutional grants are often characterized as taking an
“imperium in imperio”—state within a state—approach to home rule
authority.119 These early grants were typified by the creation of a separate
sphere of local authority within which cities could legislate, free from state
interference.120 In some states, the determination of this sphere took the form
of a list of items deemed to be of “local interest.”121 In other states, there was
not a specific list, but a more general grant of power to local governments over
all issues of local concern.122 Thus, in such states, the definition of a “state
interest” is crucial to any determination of the proper scope of home rule
authority.123 The boundary lines between state and local interests were not
easily drawn, however. Furthermore, even when grants of authority were
specific, the extent of local authority in the face of conflicting state laws
116. See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 30, at 2335 (noting that early urban reformers
“all agreed that the state creature idea of local power—in which the scope of local power was
determined by particularized state legislative commands—was not home rule and was not desirable”);
cf. Howard Lee McBain, Home Rule for Cities, PROC. OF THE ACAD. OF POL. SCI. IN THE CITY OF N.Y.,
Jan. 1915, at 1, 1–2 (advocating for the adoption of more specific home rule powers in New York, and
stating that “I take it, in the first place, that historical events have conclusively demonstrated the vanity
of the hope that legislatures will, when subject to no specific constitutional restriction, always refrain
from interfering with the affairs of cities for political or sinister purposes; or that they will, even in the
absence of ulterior motives, give sufficient attention to special laws relating to the government of cities
to accomplish an end that is highly to be desired, namely, that city governments should be founded upon
some understandable principle of political organization, and once founded upon such principle, should
not be subjected to fragmentary additions and alterations that take no account of the original design of
the structure”).
117. Note, Philadelphia Home Rule and City-County Consolidation Under the Pennsylvania
Constitution, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 84, 96–97 (1957).
118. See, e.g., KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 4, 12 (“[T]he degree of independence possessed by
local governments varies from state to state.”).
119. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4, at 27.
120. KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 12.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 111, at 282 (noting that the imperio home rule
provisions often left terms like “local” and “municipal” undefined).
123. Id. at 282–83.
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remained in flux. When state and local laws conflict, courts may permit the
state legislature to “enact a law in a functional area provided there is a
substantial state concern,” even where it intrudes on the sphere carved out for
local authority.124 Home rule authority under this framework is therefore
subject to case-by-case determinations that make it difficult for cities to know
the precise extent of their powers.125 Ultimately, courts in most major statelocal disputes tend to find “a state concern and uph[o]ld the state action.”126 In
consequence, the so-called imperio approach has been “relatively ineffective”
in carving out a protected sphere of local authority.127
2. Legislative Grants and General Legislation
The difficulties in drawing clear boundaries around a local sphere led
many states to begin to adopt a form of home rule that “provided local
government with an area in which to operate freely, subject to the ultimate
purview of the state legislature.”128 This grant of authority, also known as the
“devolution of powers” or the “residual powers” approach,129 is typical in
statutory delegations of home rule authority to local governments. Under this
framework, local governments are empowered to act in any area, unless
explicitly prohibited by state law.130 This approach differs from Dillon’s Rule,
which prevents a local government from exercising a power unless specifically
authorized to do so by the legislature.131 However, local authority may still be
altered by general laws passed by the state.
The use of “general laws” as a limit on state preemption authority
incorporates prohibitions on special legislation found in most state
constitutions.132 Under provisions that generally predate home rule,133
legislatures in most states are required to prefer general legislation over special
legislation.134 Special legislation refers to the bestowing of particular benefits
or prohibitions on individual cities. Broadly speaking, laws are “general” when
they apply to all cities in a state, or all cities within a particular classification
based on size or other characteristics.135 Whatever the classification, a general
124.
125.

ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4, at 28.
U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A-127, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY: NEEDS FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND JUDICIAL
CLARIFICATION 44 (1993).
126. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4, at 28.
127. Id. at 28–29; see also KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 12 (noting the role state courts have in
determining the scope of local authority despite the imperio approach).
128. U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 125, at 44.
129. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4, at 29–30.
130. KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 12.
131. See, e.g., ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4, at 19.
132. Weiland, supra note 33, at 264–65.
133. NEIL LITTLEFIELD, METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS AND MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 9 (1962).
134. JOHN M. WINTERS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON SOLUTIONS OF METROPOLITAN
AREA PROBLEMS 85 (1961); Nadav Shoked, Quasi-Cities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971, 1983 (2013).
135. WINTERS, supra note 134.
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law must “apply equally to each member” of the class, and cannot exempt
specific members.136 The widespread prohibition on special legislation arose
out of concerns around the turn of the twentieth century regarding the
dominance of state legislative authority and the targeting of legislation toward
individual municipalities and persons. Arguments against special legislation
ranged from legislative meddling in local affairs to facilitation of corruption.137
These special legislation clauses aimed to strengthen local governments and to
inhibit state governments from rewarding or penalizing specific entities.138 The
statutory home rule approach incorporates these prohibitions by stating that
local laws are preempted only by general laws at the state level. In this way,
negative measures designed to prevent arbitrary interference by the state
legislature were woven into more positive grants of local authority.139 Under
this framework, the proper scope of local authority in the face of a state
enactment may depend in large part on whether that state law is deemed
“general” or “special.” Part III considers the home rule framework in the
context of local environmental laws and the ability of states to divest localities
of their power.
III. STATE OVERRIDE OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES
This organizational structure means that local governments generally
derive sufficient authority from either home rule grants or underlying police
power to allow them to take action to protect the local environment.140 Thus,
the question of whether local governments have the authority to act in the first
instance is fairly settled. As cities assert their independence in a variety of
policy spheres,141 however, the exercise of that power has caused a number of
localities to come into conflict with the state. This is particularly evident in the
environmental context; “states, in addition to being sites of innovation and
flexibility and pragmatism, are sites of environmental conflicts quite as intense
as those at the federal level.”142

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 104.
FRUG ET AL., supra note 5, at 159–160.
Weiland, supra note 33, at 265.
See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4, at 25.
Mudd, supra note 114, at 5–6 (noting that many courts have found that grants of the police
power and other authority to local governments encompasses an authority to address environmental
harms). Some courts, however, may find this exercise of authority to be beyond the scope of local
authority even in the absence of state action. See Diller, supra note 2, at 1142–44 (describing the range
of laws found improper under a “prohibit/permit” test of preemption that holds that state silence on an
issue permits the conduct in question, and that localities cannot go beyond that regulatory floor to
prohibit behavior).
141. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution,
115 YALE L.J. 2218 (2006) (focusing on San Francisco’s challenge to California’s ban on same-sex
marriage).
142. CHRISTOPHER MCGRORY KLYZA & DAVID J. SOUSA, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
1990–2006: BEYOND GRIDLOCK 248 (2008).
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One example of localities taking different stances on environmental issues
than their states is in the area of climate change. Cities have taken an active role
in advocating for action in this arena. For instance, the U.S. Mayors’ Climate
Protection Agreement was launched on February 16, 2005, the day that the
Kyoto Protocol went into effect, and was intended as a response to federal
inaction on climate change and failure to ratify the Protocol.143 That agreement
specifically lists a number of actions that mayors may take to meet or exceed
the Protocol goals in their cities.144 Similar views gave rise to a conflict
between state and local governments over the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) Clean Power Plan. Twenty-six state attorneys general filed
suit against EPA, but the National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of
Mayors, and numerous individual cities participated as amici in support of
EPA’s plan.145 On these issues, some cities have staked out policy and
litigation stances independent of their parent states. Such actions do not
constitute local laws, and they may be less susceptible to state efforts to
undermine them. But in response to similar conflicts that have manifested in
environmental law making on the part of local governments,146 states have
acted to revoke authority from localities on the issues in question.
One explanation for the rise of these state and local dynamics may be the
intertwining of conservative politics and animus toward environmental
protections.147 The influence of partisan politics on the state and local
143. Corina McKendry, Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, in GREEN CITIES: AN A-TO-Z
GUIDE, supra note 29, at 318.
144. Id.
145. Julian Spector, Cities and States are Split Over Obama’s Clean Power Plan, CITYLAB (Dec.
28, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/weather/2015/12/clean-power-plan-epa-cities-states/421896/. In
April 2017, the D.C. Circuit granted EPA’s request to hold the litigation regarding the Clean Power Plan
in abeyance pending EPA’s review of the legislation.
146. Similar conflicts are also playing out between states and localities in areas such as minimum
wage laws, gay and transgender policies, menu-labeling requirements, and others. See, e.g., Diller, supra
note 98, at 1138–39, 1143.
147. See, e.g., David W. Case, The Lost Generation: Environmental Regulatory Reform in the Era
of Congressional Abdication, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 71 (2014) (“Legislative gridlock and
partisan polarization on environmental and most other issues not only intensified following the election
of President Obama in 2008, but has since reached historically high levels.”); see also EDWARD
FLATTAU, FROM GREEN TO MEAN: THE GOP’S DOWNWARD ENVIRONMENTAL SPIRAL, 31, 34, 107–11
(2016) (describing the conservative base of Republican voters as “consider[ing] environmental
regulation a governmental intrusion on individual freedom,” and detailing the rise of anti-environmental
sentiment in the Republican party); cf. SADIK-KHAN & SOLOMONOW, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that
transit initiatives in New York City proposed by the administration of Mayor Michael Bloomberg were
opposed by people “skeptical of any government action that was environmental, healthy, or ‘vaguely
French’”); Shi-Ling Hsu, The Accidental Postmodernists: A New Era of Skepticism in Environmental
Policy, 39 VT. L. REV. 27, 29–30 (2015) (“[T]he complexity of some new environmental challenges has
partisans coping with their ignorance with reflexive skepticism and instinctive hostility to proxy
enemies. Arguments over climate change, hydraulic fracturing, and the genetic modification of foods
have each generated a good deal more heat than light, in part because solid conclusions have remained
elusive.”); 2015 Anti-Environmental Budget Riders, NRDC (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/
resources/2015-anti-environmental-budget-riders (listing numerous riders in the United States Congress
designed to keep aspects of environmental rules from being funded or operational).
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relationship has long been an American reality.148 In parts of the country with a
more conservative statewide bent, cities are often more amenable to—and
potentially more in need of—environmental regulation than the surrounding
areas.149 When cities attempt to act out those goals of the urban populace, state
law makers may work to reject this kind of policy making in their states.
Another explanation is the success of business interests at the state level, and
corporate interests that value uniform standards over local innovation.150
Whatever the motivation, removal of local authority to act on
environmental issues has become a risk for local governments acting to
exercise independent authority. Unlike cases of conflicts between the federal
and state governments, strongly articulated principles of federalism do not
apply to the relationship between localities and states. Instead, states can
accomplish the alteration of local power in a number of ways, without
implicating in most cases larger principles of allocation of power. States may,
for instance, pass their own regulatory schemes that take over the field.151 In
such cases, even when a state legislature does not explicitly state its intent to do
away with local laws, passage of the state scheme may be sufficient to
impliedly preempt any separate local action.152 States may also expressly
declare their intent to preempt local laws when establishing a comprehensive—
or quasi-comprehensive—set of rules governing an issue.153 Finally, and most
relevant here, states can pass laws that do nothing more than remove local
power over certain issues.154 All of these state actions reflect attempts to alter
the authority that would otherwise be enjoyed by local governments under the
home rule framework. Subpart A considers each of these three types of state
action to remove local authority.

148. Frank J. Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, 21 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 88 (1906) (“[T]he legislature,
which under the American system exercises the state control over cities, is, and must of necessity be, the
most distinctly political body in the state. It is in the legislature that questions of state policy must be
determined. In the elections to the state legislature, party influences must be controlling. It is almost
futile to expect that a body whose members are selected as a result of a distinctly political struggle and
whose functions are so exclusively political in character, shall, when it comes to exercise its control over
cities, cease to be governed by partisan political considerations. That a large portion of the legislation of
the American commonwealths with regard to city affairs has been and is actuated by such considerations
is a fact so well known that neither evidence nor illustration is needed; it is a fact of which public
opinion takes judicial notice.”).
149. See, e.g., Patrick Sisson, Why Cities May Save Our Climate, CURBED (Oct. 31, 2016, 1:48
PM), http://www.curbed.com/2016/10/31/13479172/climate-change-urban-planning-cities-sustainableinfrastructure.
150. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 2, at 1134 (“The most common opponents of the assertion of local
authority for regulatory purposes are businesses.”).
151. See infra Part III.A.1.
152. Id.
153. See infra Part III.A.2.
154. Id.
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A. Implied Removal of Local Authority
Much of the discussion on state control over local environmental authority
to date has focused on the ways in which courts assess whether a local
regulation conflicts with, and is preempted by, state law.155 Such preemption
can occur in several ways. The Supreme Court and others have recognized two
forms of implied preemption: field preemption and conflict preemption.156 In
the former, judges may see state occupancy of a field as eliminating local
authority to act on related issues.157 The latter, conflict preemption, is generally
analyzed in terms of “physical impossibilit[ies]” and “obstacle[s].”158 Courts
look, respectively, to whether it would be literally impossible for someone to
comply with the state and local statutes,159 or whether a local measure presents
an “obstacle” to achieving the purposes and objectives of the state statute.160
In the environmental context, implied preemption has come up in a
number of cases involving local limits on natural gas extraction via hydraulic
fracturing, or “fracking.” For instance, a court found that provisions of the
West Virginia Code preempted a local fracking ban. The court relied on “the
State’s interest in oil and gas development and production throughout the
State” to find that the Code should be interpreted to provide for exclusive
control of oil and gas development by the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection.161 Colorado courts have also employed an implied
preemption analysis to assess whether local regulations pose “operational
conflicts with state objectives.”162 Other courts, including those in New York
and Pennsylvania, have considered local fracking regulations within the context
of existing state oil and gas law, and found that such state laws could not be
read to imply total preemption of the field.163 As a result, local measures
regulating some aspects of fracking were permitted.164 This kind of implied

155.
156.
157.

See, e.g., Diller, supra note 2, at 1126; Outka, supra note 104, at 966–75.
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
Diller, supra note 2, at 1153 (“The more pervasively and thoroughly the legislature has
regulated a field, the argument goes, the more likely it is that the state legislature ‘intended’ to
completely occupy that field and not allow for local regulation, even if the legislature never expressly
declared such an intent.”).
158. Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE:
THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 131 (2009).
159. Stated another way, the question is whether a local ordinance “permits an act prohibited by a
statute or prohibits an act permitted by a statute.” Diller, supra note 2, at 1142.
160. Schroeder, supra note 158, at 132.
161. Outka, supra note 104, at 968 (citing Ne. Nat. Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *9 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011)).
162. Id. at 969; City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 577 (Colo. 2016)
(finding an “operational conflict” between city fracking bans and applicable state law, and therefore
finding city ban preempted and unenforceable).
163. Outka, supra note 104, at 966–68, 970–71 (discussing Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d
1188 (N.Y. 2014) and Huntley & Huntley v. Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2009)).
164. Id.
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preemption analysis may be employed whenever an arguably relevant state law
operates as a backdrop to a local activity; the precise analysis varies by state.
B. Express Removal of Local Authority
State removal of local authority may also come much more directly, in
two different ways. First, express preemption of local authority may be
accomplished through state legislation on a subject that includes a clause
expressly preempting local authority to regulate in the area.165 Although courts
may again engage in various interpretations of legislative intent when
confronted with apparently express preemption,166 “[i]t is well-established that
within Constitutional limits Congress may preempt state authority by so stating
in express terms.”167 The same is true of state legislatures. Thus, a state may
preempt local laws by regulating in the same field as a local government and by
noting its intent to preempt local authority.168 Second, states may enact
legislation explicitly aimed at circumscribing the grant of home rule power
with regard to a particular issue. Such laws do not establish state law in the
area, but instead function only to remove local authority to regulate on the topic
in question.169 This kind of removal of local authority does not implicate
preemption doctrine, but rather gets to the heart of home rule authority. Express
removal of authority can take either of these forms, or may be a hybrid of the
two.170
The focus of this Article is on those instances where the explicit removal
of local authority is the sole or primary function of the state legislation. Where
a state has a long history of regulation in an area that would rise to the level of
occupation of the field, or passes new, comprehensive regulations, a state law
that also includes an express preemption clause may not be governed by the
discussion below. At the same time, statements of interest in a particular field,
165. Indeed, some state courts require an express statement of intent to preempt before any such
preemption will be found. See, e.g., Outka, supra note 104, at 968, 983 (describing New York and
Kansas state courts as “avoiding intrastate preemption absent express legislative intent”).
166. Schroeder, supra note 158, at 122–24 (describing interpretive principles related to express
preemption).
167. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203
(1983) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
168. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 2, at 1138 (noting that, in most states, “the legislature is free to
expressly preempt any city ordinance”).
169. See, e.g., van de Biezenbos, supra note 114, at 1656–57 (describing examples of targeted
preemption of local authority to regulate natural gas extraction).
170. See, e.g., H.R. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015) (House Bill 40 cites the state framework
for regulation of oil and gas activities and notes that “[i]t is in the interest of this state to explicitly
confirm the authority to regulate oil and gas operations in this state. The legislature intends that this Act
expressly preempt the regulation of oil and gas operations by municipalities and other political
subdivisions, which is impliedly preempted by the statutes already in effect.” H.B. 40 goes on to more
explicitly remove the authority of local governments to “enact or enforce an ordinance or other measure,
or an amendment or revision of an ordinance or other measure, that bans, limits, or otherwise regulates
an oil and gas operation within the boundaries or extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality or
political subdivision.”).
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without more, should not be controlling. This Article hones in on instances
where the rules of preemption are inapplicable because of the lack of
substantive state regulation on the subject.
Reactive, targeted elimination of local authority by state legislatures goes
beyond the typical move of state legislatures to preempt local laws by
establishing statewide schemes of maximum, minimum, or non-discretionary
standards.171 At the core of the new elimination of local authority appears to be
“state decision makers’ suspicions about local decision making,”172 and the
growing prevalence of these state actions may undermine arguments advanced
by some local government scholars that “direct state efforts to overturn local
governmental decisions are relatively rare.”173 As partisan splits on
environmental policy continue to divide the state and local levels of
government, such attempts by the state to stop local action may become more
frequent. These state efforts may operate to limit local involvement in
environmental law and policy,174 and to thereby ensure that certain
environmental issues are left unaddressed.
While far from a new trend,175 the targeted removal of local authority over
environmental and other matters has negative consequences. Such state action
can pose a threat to local innovation176 and ideals of governance, as it
“suppresses the interest of municipal citizens to participate directly in
decisionmaking which affects them.”177 Moreover, this state behavior is
contrary to the very goals of the home rule movement. That movement was

171. See, e.g., Weiland, supra note 33, at 268 (describing state preemption of local laws
exclusively in terms of standard setting).
172. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 6, at 143.
173. Id. at 33 (characterizing literature of local government scholars, such as Richard Briffault,
that attribute a considerable amount of power to local governments).
174. Weiland, supra note 33, at 238.
175. FRUG, supra note 14, at 53 (“[I]t seems ironic that city powerlessness became firmly
established as a legal principle during the last few decades of the nineteenth century, the period
described in Arthur Schlesinger’s seminal history of cities entitled The Rise of the City. On the other
hand, it may not be ironic at all. As Schlesinger argues, urbanization reinforced the felt need for controls
over city power.”).
176. Diller, supra note 2, at 1114 (“[T]he primary threat to local innovation is the charge of
intrastate preemption.”); cf. KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 2 (noting that “possessing substantial
freedom from state government control is vital for the development of dynamic communities”).
177. George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of Municipal
Power in Home Rule, 22 STETSON L. REV. 643, 644 (1993); see also Rita Barnett-Rose, Judicially
Modified Democracy: Court and State Pre-Emption of Local GMO Regulation in Hawaii and Beyond,
26 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 71, 105 (2015) (“[B]y finding that the local ordinances were pre-empted
by state and federal law, the district court did make the radical decision to remove local citizen
participation in the democratic process.”); David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93
TEX. L. REV. 351, 377 (2014) (describing the “long tradition in economics, positive theory, and other
quasi-utilitarian traditions of examining jurisdictional conflicts . . . using the matching principle, which
would house regulatory authority at the lowest level of government that encompasses (geographically)
the costs and benefits of the regulated activity”).
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designed to get away from piecemeal grants of authorities to localities,178 and
the influence of special interests at the state level. Systematic removal of local
authority because states dislike or disagree with local policy solutions
undermines the intention of home rule, as well as citizen involvement and the
ability to work toward a clean environment.179 Using plastic bag bans as an
example, the discussion below will show how the current state of the law may
fail to protect against targeted state removal of local authority over
environmental measures.
IV. CASE STUDY: BANNING BAG BANS UNDER THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK
Plastic bag bans, and bans on those bag bans, provide a straightforward
instance of targeted state preemption of local measures. This Part will provide a
brief background on the ways these prohibitions have been implemented in a
number of states. It will then assess how challenges to such state laws would
proceed under a typical home rule analysis.
Common practice throughout the United States has long involved freely
distributing plastic bags to customers along with any purchase. However,
production and disposal of these plastic bags can lead to waste and pollution180
that in turn has a number of negative impacts, including harms to wildlife,181
space in landfills,182 and others.183 In an effort to discourage use of these bags,
a number of municipalities have passed laws mandating that retailers charge a
fee for any plastic bags they hand out; some have banned the use of plastic bags
entirely.184 These laws are intended to remedy the pollution of landscape and

178. Cf. Joni Armstrong Coffey, The Case for Fiscal Home Rule, FLA. B.J., April 1997, at 54–55;
Christopher W. Hammons, State Constitutional Reform: Is It Necessary?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1327, 1346
n.122 (2001) (noting that, in New York, “[t]he Citizen’s Union argued for greater home rule for cities,
and suggested that the piecemeal amendments adopted between 1894 and 1938 had created much
obsolete or partially inapplicable matter in the state Constitution, which needed to be excised”).
179. Cf. SHUTKIN, supra note 35, at 128 (noting the importance of “meaningful, informed
participation in the decision-making procedures that affect the quality of people’s lives” for civic
democratic practice and, in turn, civic environmentalism).
180. See, e.g., John Roach, Are Plastic Grocery Bags Sacking the Environment?, NAT.
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Sept. 2, 2003), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/09/0902_030902_
plasticbags.html (noting that millions of plastic bags end up as litter each year, and that “[o]nce in the
environment, it takes months to hundreds of years for plastic bags to breakdown. As they decompose,
tiny toxic bits seep into soils, lakes, rivers, and the oceans.”).
181. See, e.g., Ocean Plastics Pollution: A Global Tragedy for Our Oceans and Sea Life, CENT.
FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/ocean_plastics/ (last visited
July 20, 2017) (describing the harms to sea turtles from ingesting plastic bags).
182. See, e.g., Daniella Dimitrova Russo & Todd Myers, Should Cities Ban Plastic Bags?, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444165804578006832478
712400 (discussing the cost of putting plastic bags in landfill).
183. See, e.g., CHRIS GIBSON ET AL., HOUSEHOLD SUSTAINABILITY: CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS
IN EVERYDAY LIFE 91–92 (2013) (noting plastic bags significantly impact “fossil fuel use”).
184. Comprehensive information on these kinds of bans and charges nationwide is available via
Novolex, a packaging company. For a mapping tool to find information on all 50 states, see BAG THE
BAN, http://www.bagtheban.com/in-your-state (last visited July 20, 2017).
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water attributable to disposal of plastic bags, prevent that waste from ending up
in a landfill, and correct for the difficulty of recycling this type of material.185
Although there are currently robust debates being had about whether such bans
result in net positive environmental impacts,186 it appears uncontroverted that
cities that have instituted such fines and bans have seen a significant drop in
plastic bag use. In many instances, these fees or bans form part of a larger
environmental and sustainability portfolio for cities.187
Bans on plastic bags are not a new solution to plastic pollution,188 nor are
they limited to the United States.189 Within this country, however, some states
have responded to local measures by essentially banning bag bans.190 State
action to date has not involved explicit regulation of plastic bags or containers,
but has instead contained only a prohibition on local action.191 For instance,
following a local measure in Tucson, Arizona that banned the use of plastic
bags by local businesses, the state of Arizona passed a law in 2015 stating that
cities and counties may neither “regulate the sale, use or disposition of
auxiliary containers,” nor “impose a tax, fee, assessment, charge or return
deposit” for auxiliary containers.192 As Columbia, Missouri debated a local ban
on plastic bags, the state legislature enacted a measure to prohibit these kinds of
local laws.193 Missouri’s version of a ban on bag bans—passed over a
governor’s veto—states that all merchants doing business in the state “shall
have the option to provide customers either a paper or a plastic bag for the
packing of any item or good purchased,” and prohibits political subdivisions

185. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Is It Time to Bag the Plastic?, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/sunday-review/should-america-bag-the-plastic-bag.html (“[P]lastic
bags are the bane of recycling programs” as the bags themselves are very difficult to recycle, and, when
placed into bins with general plastic, the plastic bags “jam and damage expensive sorting machines,
which cost huge amounts to repair.”).
186. See, e.g., GIBSON ET AL., supra note 183, at 94–95, 97–98 (noting that reusable bag impact
heavily depends on the number of times the bag is used).
187. Supra notes 39–43 (describing anti-pollution measures including reduction of plastic bags).
188. See, e.g., MULLANY, supra note 38, at 8–12 (describing bans on plastic, Styrofoam, and other
plastic products in states and cities around the country).
189. See, e.g., Émilie Clavel, Think You Can’t Live Without Plastic Bags? Consider This: Rwanda
Did It, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2014, 7:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/15/
rwanda-banned-plastic-bags-so-can-we.
190. See infra notes 194–200.
191. In contrast to the state-level actions in many parts of the country, in November 2016, voters in
California approved Proposition 67, a statewide single-use carryout bag ban. As a result, specified
grocery stores, retail stores, and liquor stores will no longer be able to provide single-use plastic carryout
bags to their customers. See Single-Use Carryout Bag Ban (SB 270), CALRECYCLE, http://www.cal
recycle.ca.gov/Plastics/CarryOutBags/ (last updated Nov. 9, 2016).
192. S. 1241, 52nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2015). After a lawsuit was filed challenging the
legitimacy of SB 1241 for, among other things, violating the title and single-subject mandates in the
state constitution, a revised version of the bill was passed in 2016. See H.R. 2131, 52nd Leg., 2nd Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2016).
193. Ray Howze, Legislature Says Missouri Cities Can’t Ban Plastic Bags or Set ‘Living Wage,’
ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (May 6, 2015), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/legislature-says-missouricities-cant-ban-plastic-bags-or-set-living-wage#stream/0.
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from imposing “any ban, fee, or tax upon the use of either paper or plastic bags
for packaging of any item or good purchased.” 194 And Indiana has passed a law
revoking from its grant of home rule the power to “regulate, or adopt or enforce
an ordinance to regulate” the manufacture, distribution, sale, provision, use,
disposition or disposal of auxiliary containers, or impose any prohibition,
restriction, fee, or tax with respect to auxiliary containers.195 Similar actions
have been taken in Wisconsin,196 Idaho,197 and Michigan.198
In Arizona, the statewide ban on plastic bag bans has been challenged in
court on a number of bases, including violation of the state’s home rule
doctrine.199 The plaintiff in that lawsuit, a member of the City Council in
Tempe, Arizona, alleges that SB 1241 prevented the Council in Tempe from
moving forward on a local bag ban.200 No decision has yet been issued in this
case. However, it may be possible to predict the likelihood of success of this
claim under a traditional home rule analysis. The analysis below discusses the
possible ways that a court might rule on this issue. Arizona is a constitutional
home rule state, and the plaintiffs styled the claim against the state’s
prohibition on home rule bag bans as an infringement on an area of local
interest. Further, another subpart assesses the likely fate of the same kind of
ban in a legislative home rule state. While both analyses will necessarily vary
by state, and by the language of the constitution and local legislation at issue,
Arizona’s example may provide a helpful demonstration of the barriers that
local environmental measures face when confronted with targeted state action.
A. Constitutional Home Rule
As noted, in states with constitutional home rule provisions, localities are
generally granted authority over all topics of local concern. Courts determine
whether something is of local concern, meaning that the judiciary wields a
great deal of power. Judicial assessment of the “local” nature of an issue
generally comes down to a multi-factored analysis,201 and it is often difficult to
predict whether a court will characterize a particular topic as a matter of state or

194.
195.

H.R. 722, 89th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015).
H.R. 1053, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016) (amending Section I.C. § 36-1-38). Far from being a typical course of action by the state government, the only other example of this kind
of removal of local power in Indiana’s home rule statute is directed at local measures requiring
participation in a Section 8 housing program or similar programs. See I.C. §§ 36–1–3–8; 36–1–3–8.5
(2016).
196. See WIS. STAT. § 66.0419 (2017).
197. See H.R. 372, 63rd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2016).
198. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.592 (2016).
199. Complaint at 7–8, Kuby v. Arizona, No. CV2015-011434 (Ariz. Super. Sept. 30, 2015).
200. Id.
201. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 95, at 1351.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2916917

FINAL PDF FOX ARTICLE - 44.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

602

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

12/5/17 4:42 PM

[Vol. 44:575

local interest.202 Historically, however, courts have given broad constructions
to state interests and narrower interpretations to their local counterparts.203
In Arizona, the state constitution establishes the right of cities to frame a
charter for their own government.204 There are nineteen different charter cities
in Arizona, each with unique charters.205 These cities must act according to the
powers laid out in their charters; thus, they must be able to point to specific
grants of authority that either directly or impliedly provide authority for any
action taken.206 In general, the charter power includes “all that is necessary or
incident to the government of the municipality.”207 Arizona courts have read
grants of charter authority to impliedly include the police power, which can be
used to address things like regulation of billboard lighting208 and fencing
requirements.209 In other circumstances, however, such as the tax power,210
courts have found local action improper absent a more specific grant of
authority.
“[W]here a home rule city has power by its charter it may act in
conformity with such power not only in matters of local concern, but also in
matters of state-wide concern, within its territorial limits,” provided there are
no conflicting state rules.211 There appears to be no bright-line test for
establishing whether something is of state or local concern. Instead, courts
engage in highly fact-intensive inquiries, looking at the characteristics of the
action and its relative impacts at the state or local level.212 The state is barred
from regulating the conduct of local governments on purely local issues.213
However, assuming proper authority on the part of the city, both cities and
states “may legislate on the same subject when that subject is of local concern
or when . . . the charter or particular state legislation confers on the city express

202. See Darin M. Dalmat, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home: The Legal Viability of
Local Minimum Wage Laws Under Home Rule, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 93, 105 (2005).
203. KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 13; Schragger, supra note 3, at 70 (“[C]ourts tend to defer to
legislatures in large part because of the judges’ inability to settle on nonpolitical principles for dividing
up authority.”).
204. ARIZ. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
205. City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d 624, 626 (Ariz. 2012).
206. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Allt, 545 P.2d 76, 81 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (holding a city’s ordinance
authorizing the purchase of liquor was a “‘municipal concern’ in which the state may not interfere”).
207. City of Tucson v. Walker, 135 P.2d 223, 226 (Ariz. 1943).
208. See Whiteco Outdoor Advert. v. City of Tucson, 972 P.2d 647, 651 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
209. Arizona Fence Contractors Ass’n v. City of Phoenix Advisory & Appeals Bd., 436 P.2d 641,
643 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968).
210. Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz., Inc. v. Riddel, 510 P.2d 376, 378 (Ariz. 1973).
211. City of Tucson v. Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 164 P.2d 598, 601 (Ariz. 1945).
212. Strode v. Sullivan, 236 P.2d 48, 52 (Ariz. 1951) (detailing the “court’s views on different fact
situations” with regard to whether the subject matter of a local law “was of local concern or statewide
interest”); see also City of Tucson v. State, 333 P.3d 761, 767 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that rules
governing local elections are solely of local interest); City of Phoenix v. Harnish, 150 P.3d 245, 251
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that eminent domain is a matter of state interest).
213. Strode, 236 P.2d at 52; see also City of Tucson, 333 P.3d at 765.
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power to legislate thereon.”214 But where “the subject is of statewide concern,
and the legislature has appropriated the field by enacting a statute pertaining
thereto, that statute governs throughout the state.”215 Contrary local ordinances
within the state are therefore invalid.216
The regulation of plastic bags by Tempe is arguably a proper exercise of
local power in Arizona. Bag pollution has a localized impact on environmental
health, and cities are granted police powers to address such issues.217
Nonetheless, the state may still be able to regulate in the area if it establishes a
simultaneous state interest. Senate Bill 1241 attempts to do this, stating plainly
that “[t]he regulation of . . . the sale, use and disposition of auxiliary containers
is a matter of statewide concern.”218 The precise question of whether such
uniform business or environmental standards constitute a state interest has not
been decided in Arizona. Given the general latitude in assessing whether
something triggers a state interest, it appears likely that regulation of auxiliary
containers would qualify as such an interest. The state would then be permitted
to override local bans.219 Therefore, home rule challenges to the ban on bag
bans would likely be unsuccessful under a traditional analysis.
B. Legislative Home Rule
As noted, Arizona employs a system of constitutional home rule through
charter grants. To make the discussion more nationally applicable, however,
this Article will extrapolate similar facts to a legislative home rule system to
see how local bag bans would fare in that situation. Generally speaking, in
states using legislative grants of home rule authority, that authority is expressly
limited by conflicting general state laws.220 Thus, local authority is permitted

214. City of Tucson v. Rineer, 971 P.2d 207, 209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Flagstaff Vending
Co. v. City of Flagstaff, 578 P.2d 985, 988 (Ariz. 1978)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See TEMPE, ARIZ., CHARTER OF THE CITY art. 1, § 1.01 (1964), http://www.tempe.gov/
home/showdocument?id=8594 (“The municipal corporation now existing and known as the ‘City of
Tempe’ shall remain and continue to be a body politic and corporate under the name of the ‘City of
Tempe’ with all powers, functions, rights, privileges and immunities possible under the Constitution and
general laws of Arizona as fully as though they were specifically enumerated in this Charter, and all of
the powers, functions, rights, privileges and immunities granted or to be granted to charter cities and to
cities and towns incorporated under the provisions of Title 9, Arizona Revised Statutes, not in conflict
herewith. The enumeration of the powers, functions, rights, privileges and immunities made in this
Charter shall never be construed to preclude, by implication, or otherwise, the city from doing any and
all things not inhibited by the constitution and laws of Arizona.”).
218. S. 1241, 52nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2015).
219. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. State, 957 P.2d 341, 344 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that, in
deciding whether something is of statewide concern, legislative declarations to that effect are entitled to
deference, and that the court must engage in a balancing test to evaluate whether local or state interests
are paramount).
220. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 11 (“A home rule borough or city may exercise all
legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter.”).
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only as long as the state has not issued a contrary statement.221 Any flexibility
that courts may have to preserve local autonomy using flexible interpretations
of state and local interests therefore does not apply in such systems.222
One of the only real limitations on this kind of denial of local power is the
prohibition against special legislation.223 As noted, special legislation is
legislation that treats cities, or classes of cities, differently than other cities or
classes of cities within the state. Functionally, prohibitions on special
legislation have not presented a great barrier to state action. Generally
speaking, “it is not what a law includes that makes it unconstitutional as a
special law, but what it excludes.”224 While states apply a variety of tests, the
formulation generally looks only to whether the law “applies alike to all local
governments in terms and in effect.”225 If that is the case, the prohibition on
special legislation will not block a state’s ability to act.226 Even if the statute
does discriminate against some cities, certain exceptions can save the law.227
Arizona’s bag ban applies to all cities and counties in the state; therefore, it is
likely to be found to be a valid general law under a traditional analysis.228
The analysis for a variety of environmental initiatives by localities would
likely look similar to that for bag bans in both constitutional and statutory home
rule states. In consequence, the narrative to date has been that little can be done
in terms of the home rule framework to combat state measures that target local
action.229 The historic deference to state action and legal ambiguity of localities
make it possible for states to chill the experimentation of their local
governments on a number of policy issues. It is therefore necessary to move
beyond the traditional confines of the home rule analysis. Part V considers
legal tools to supplement the home rule analysis and aid local efforts to combat
reactive state legislation in the environmental context.

221. Cf. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 6, at 69 (noting that, in Massachusetts, the home rule grant
permits cities “to act when the state legislature has not said [they] cannot act”).
222. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1999) (suggesting possible ways in which courts can avoid head-to-head
conflicts between state and local laws); see also Dalmat, supra note 202, at 93, 107.
223. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 111, at 244–46.
224. 2 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 4:43 (3d ed.).
225. See, e.g., Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y. State Pub. Emp. Relations Bd.,
728 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y. Inc. v.
City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d 789 (App. Div.), aff’d as modified, 767 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 2001).
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Kelley v. McGee, 443 N.E.2d 908, 913 (N.Y. 1982) (noting that matters of state
concern constitute an exception to the special legislation bar).
228. See, e.g., Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen’s Found., 637 P.2d 1053, 1061 (Ariz. 1981) (“[A]
law will be general if it applies to all cases and to all members of the specified class to which the law is
made applicable.”).
229. See, e.g., Jacob Alderdice, Impeding Local Laboratories: Obstacles to Urban Policy
Diffusion in Local Government Law, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 473 (2013) (noting that the
“existing legal structure facing local government currently privileges state, executive, and business
interests over the innovation and spread of urban policy”).
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V. JUDICIAL ALLOCATION OF STATE AND LOCAL POWER
In order to protect progressive local policies from reactive state laws,
localities must pursue solutions beyond the traditional home rule framework.
Running parallel to the strict formulations of home rule are a number of cases
in which judges, under a variety of rationales, allocate power in favor of the
locality. Some judges alter their analyses to identify state goals to divest local
authority and thwart these efforts. Judges have a tendency to assume an active
role in allocating authority between state and local governments. This
phenomenon, what some have called the “shadow doctrine,”230 has a long
history in local government law, dating back to the debates between Judges
Dillon and Cooley.231 Courts have long been a powerful influence in
determining the proper allocation of state and local authority and how best to
interpret the strictures of home rule in a given situation.232
Elements of the Supreme Court’s line of so-called “animus” cases related
to the Equal Protection Clause may form another part of this shadowy element
of local government law. Both kinds of cases, described in greater detail below,
have provided bulwarks in some instances against state incursions on local
authority, and they illustrate a longstanding truth about home rule: given the
lack of constitutional language governing the distribution of power between
state and local governments, judge-made doctrine and assumptions play a
sizable role in the final outcome of home rule determinations.233 Neither the
“shadow doctrine” as it currently stands, nor the equal protection doctrine, are
easy to apply in the environmental context. But these doctrines’ ability to
preserve local policy making may point to other means of forging a path
forward. To the extent that applicable substantive protections can be found,
courts may push back against reactive state action in the face of local
environmental policy making.
A. The “Shadow Doctrine” of Local Government Law
In discussing the legacy of Dillon’s Rule and the modern realities of home
rule, a number of scholars have made the case that there exists a protected
sphere of judicially recognized local authority, which may explain why certain

230. Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and the Political
Currency of Local Government, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 393, 408 (2002).
231. See, e.g., Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 95, at 1349 (describing the substantive choices by
judges that home rule decisions involve); Williams, supra note 67, at 85–86 (noting that, since 1870,
judges have “incorporat[ed] their attitudes toward governmental power (inseparable from their political
beliefs) into municipal law”).
232. Cf. LITTLEFIELD, supra note 133, at 18 (“The doctrine of an exclusive power of a city with
respect to its municipal affairs is entirely a judicial invention in aid of the underlying principles of
municipal home rule having no basis in the constitutional language of most home rule provisions.”).
233. Williams, supra note 67, at 85–86.
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cases come out differently in the home rule framework.234 Courts may decide
conflicts in favor of localities under this “shadow doctrine” of local
government law where they are motivated to find “that communities should be
empowered to choose policies consonant with local values.”235 Thus, in fields
such as zoning, land use, and school financing and districting, courts have often
upheld local authority against intrusions by the state.236
While these cases point to a means by which judges have elected to escape
the strict outcomes of the home rule analysis, they are unlikely to apply to
environmental law cases across the board. Although land use and zoning have
been recognized as matters predominantly of local authority, the same kinds of
rationale do not appear to apply more generally to environmental law. That
result is perhaps not unusual; as noted, many environmental issues and impacts
bleed beyond local boundaries.237 Thus, unlike some fields involving entirely
local impacts,238 the opposite principles are often in play in the environmental
context, where there has long been a push toward law making at increasingly
higher levels of government. An argument could, of course, be advanced for
looking at environmental issues on a local, case-by-case basis. But without a
principle as to why local laws should govern on such topics, and without a
more specific grounding principle, it is hard to make a case that environmental
law is a uniquely local endeavor. In consequence, while the “shadow doctrine”
may provide an exception to the home rule analysis for certain kinds of cases, it
is unlikely to offer any particular relief in the bag ban example, or in other
kinds of reactive, targeted state legislation aimed at local environmental
measures.
B. Federal Constitutional Provisions
Another example of local government-friendly outcomes in assessing state
and local conflicts comes from a series of decisions by the United States
Supreme Court. These cases have considered scenarios that, like bans on bag
bans, are targeted state removals of local authority to carry out what might be
characterized as progressive policies. In these cases, the Court has questioned
states’ abilities to eliminate local power to enact laws that advance the
234. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 222, at 18‒19 (“[L]itigations have had only a limited effect in
displacing the structure of decentralized responsibility for education finance and unfettered local control
over land use. Indeed, they demonstrate the extent of the state commitment to preserving a strong local
role in these areas.”); Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: AntiFederalism from the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U.L. REV. 74, 99 (1990);
Schragger, supra note 230, at 409.
235. Schragger, supra note 230, at 409.
236. See id. at 235; see also Briffault, supra note 222, at 18; Rose, supra note 234, at 99.
237. Wiener, supra, note 31, at 1962.
238. See, e.g., Michael Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism, 64 WASH. L. REV. 51, 69
(1989) (critiquing California’s overturning of local criminal policies on implied preemption grounds and
noting that “nearly every significant aspect of criminal law enforcement reflects a norm [of]
decentralization”).
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individual liberties of citizens. The analysis in these cases has not proceeded
along the lines of typical equal protection doctrine analysis. While many
explanations for this deviation have been proffered, one that a number of
scholars have adopted is a view of the animus cases as a protection of local
experimentation, a desire to weed out state behavior motivated by animus, or
both.239
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution protects
against state legislation that improperly creates classes of persons and treats
like classes differently. At the core of the Clause’s protections is an insistence
that “government classifications be both rational and free of illegitimate
motivations such as simple dislike of the burdened group.”240 The Equal
Protection Clause vindicates individual rights, not rights of geographic areas or
communities.241 However, those “[i]ndividual rights in the Constitution
constrain state power over municipalities.”242 Thus, “if a state violates the
constitutional rights of individuals, the fact that it does so by changing
municipal powers . . . does not insulate it from suit.”243 Equal protection
doctrine therefore provides an additional layer of consideration to the typical
home rule analysis. In addition to the factors already discussed, the state cannot
make changes to local powers that violate the constitutional rights of its
citizens.244

239. See Marc R. Poirier, “Whiffs of Federalism” in United States v. Windsor: Power, Localism,
and Kulturkampf, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 935, 964–65, 979 (2014) (“[T]he Court step[ped] in to protect
the evolving understanding of human dignity as it is investigated locally by the people.”); see also
William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal Protection Cases, 34 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 493, 502–03 (2007) (arguing that an “‘exhibition’ of animus triggered more searching judicial
review”); Barron, supra note 30, at 562; Lawrence Rosenthal, Romer v. Evans as the Transformation of
Local Government Law, 31 URB. LAW. 257, 260, 268–69 (1999) (stating that Romer stands for the
proposition that “it is irrational to deny local governments the power to address local problems”).
240. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL
POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (2015).
241. David F. Coursen, Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and Actions to Promote Environmental
Justice, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Rep.) 10,201, 10,205 (2009).
242. Josh Bendor, Note, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A New Approach, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 389, 419 (2013).
243. Id.; see also Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982) (announcing
that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids “plac[ing] special burdens on the ability of minority groups to
achieve beneficial legislation”).
244. See, e.g., Weiland, supra note 33, at 262–63 (discussing how the Supreme Court has used the
Fifteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down
state statutes that altered local powers to the detriment of individual rights). Localities themselves,
however, may not have constitutional rights that can be invoked against the state. Doctrine from Hunter
v. City of Pittsburgh “bars localities from invoking the Constitution against their own states;” although
not strictly followed by courts, it remains precedential. See Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local
Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012). But see Richard Briffault, Who
Rules at Home? One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 347–48 (1993)
(theorizing that Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) and progeny stand for the proposition
that “[s]tates that provide for elective local governments must abide by the constitutional rules for
representative democracies”).
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The Supreme Court made this point explicit in Romer v. Evans.245 In
Romer, the Supreme Court considered another reaction at the state level against
local progressivism: a state effort to prohibit laws barring discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.246 From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, several
cities in Colorado passed laws banning discrimination based on sexual
orientation in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, health
and welfare services, and other transactions and activities.247 In response,
voters in Colorado adopted by referendum Amendment 2, which “prohibit[ed]
all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local
government designed to protect the named class”—a class which the court
referred to as “homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.”248 The Romer
plaintiffs challenged Amendment 2 as unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds.249 The case then came before the Supreme Court.
Equal protection analysis typically looks first to the persons affected by
the challenged action. If the affected persons are part of a protected class, the
Court will apply strict scrutiny to the law; if they are not, then the Court will
look only for whether there is a rational basis for the legislation.250 Colorado
state courts found that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny because it
infringed on the fundamental rights of those affected; therefore, the courts
enjoined its enforcement.251 On appeal, the Supreme Court did not find that the
affected groups constituted a protected class; nor did it engage in traditional
rational basis review, which would have provided for substantial deference to
be given to the state’s proffered explanation for the legislation.252 Instead, it
found that, because the law was rooted in legislative animus, it was not
supported by a rational basis.253 Finding no “identifiable legitimate purpose or
discrete objective” to the law other than discrimination against a certain class,
the Court deemed it impermissible class legislation in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.254
Thus, the Romer Court did not apply a traditional suspect class
formulation to the question of whether Amendment 2 was permissible. Instead,
it employed a rational basis analysis and found that animus on the part of the
legislature cannot form a rational basis for a law. In this way, the case
represented a step outside the traditional model of affording deference to
legislatures under the rational basis framework. The decision offered a means
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Id. at 623–24.
Id.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 631–32.
Id. at 634 (“[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”).
254. Id. at 635.
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by which the Court could peer behind the law to more closely examine its
motivations. The perception of animus on the part of the state in Romer appears
to have been the driving factor in this analysis; the same could potentially also
be said of United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno255 and City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.256 Together, these cases provide a
foundation for the Court’s “anti-animus methodology.”257 The foundation of
this anti-animus bent is “that just as individuals have a moral and sometimes
legal duty not to act maliciously toward others, the group of people elected as
representatives . . . has a moral and sometimes constitutional duty not to act
maliciously toward a person or group of people.”258 Therefore, “legislation
must have some substantial justification beyond ‘we don’t like you,’ ‘we
couldn’t care less about you,’ or ‘we just want it that way.’”259 Viewed through
this lens, the animus cases focus more on “legislative process than [on]
legislative results”; they do not declare a fundamental right to certain benefits,
but they do disallow legislative process motivated by a desire to harm a
disadvantaged group.260 Of course, critics of the animus cases may characterize
these opinions as impermissible judicial determination of substantive policy
that overrides popular will.261 In this light, the willingness to step outside the
bounds of traditional rational basis review and peer into legislative motivations
is outcome-driven and outcome-determinative. Nevertheless, the animus cases
have made clear the impermissibility of legislation that has as its primary

255. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). At issue in Moreno was the exclusion from the Federal Food Stamp Act
of any household that contained a person not related to any other person in the household. Id. at 529. In
examining the rationale for the exclusion, the Court found that it had been enacted to prevent the
participation of “hippies” or those in “hippie communes.” Id. at 534. The Court concluded that “a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest,” and that the exclusion therefore lacked a rational basis. Id. at 534, 538.
256. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In Cleburne, the Court considered the denial of a special use permit for
the operation of a group home for those with intellectual disabilities. Id. at 435. The Court rejected a
formulation that the intellectually disabled were a quasi-suspect class. Id. at 442–47. Nevertheless, the
Court found the denial improper because it lacked a rational basis and was motivated instead by
“negative attitudes” or “fear.” Id. at 448–50.
257. Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183,
204–05 (2014) (describing “Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer” as the “[a]nimus [p]recedents,” and quoting
Cass Sunstein as calling them a “trilogy”).
258. Id. at 185.
259. Id. at 230.
260. Id. at 230–31.
261. Id. at 185; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating
that “[t]he Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite,” and arguing that the constitutional
amendment at issue was an attempt by Coloradans to “preserve traditional sexual mores against the
efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws. That objective,
and the means chosen to achieve it, are not only unimpeachable under any constitutional doctrine
hitherto pronounced (hence the opinion’s heavy reliance upon principles of righteousness rather than
judicial holdings); they have been specifically approved by the Congress of the United States and by this
Court.”); cf. Daniel O. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 IND. L. J. 27, 38–
42 (2014) (criticizing the use of an animus justification to strike down state barriers to same-sex
marriage).
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purpose the infliction of injury or indignity.262 In the same way as the special
legislation doctrine protects against the singling out of particular cities for
favorable or unfavorable treatment, the Equal Protection Clause protects
against such singling out of individuals.263 Thus, the “core anti-animus
requirement” of the Equal Protection Clause264 provides a check on state action
outside of the home rule framework.
Several scholars have drawn a more explicit connection between the
animus cases and home rule. Scholars have characterized Romer, Windsor, and
similar cases as containing “whiffs of federalism,”265 “traces of local
constitutionalism,”266 or, more explicitly, a prohibition on state preemption of
unpopular local political processes.267 While these theories vary, the arguments
all boil down to a rejection of a higher level of government’s interference with
policy experimentation that will further the rights of citizens at a lower level.268
This process-based explanation means that the cases establish no substantive
guarantees of benefits, but simply force the federal or state government to
“back off of . . . particular intrusion[s].”269 This kind of support of local
constitutional enforcement may uphold parochial policies as well as
progressive ones.270 But it also ensures that “states may not preclude their local

262.
263.
264.

Carpenter, supra note 257, at 243.
See Araiza, supra note 239, at 504.
William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal
Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B. U. L. REV. 367, 412–13 (2014).
265. Poirier, supra note 239, at 977. The phrase “whiffs of federalism” used in this title comes
from Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2720 (2013) (Alito,
J., dissenting).
266. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City, supra note 30, at 494, 496.
267. Rosenthal, supra note 239, at 258. The federalist support for the Court’s Windsor decision,
for instance, posits that the federal government lacked authority for the Defense of Marriage Act, “an
unprecedented expansion of federal authority into a domain traditionally controlled by the states.”
Carpenter, supra note 257, at 198.
268. See Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City, supra note 30, at 495 (“Constitutional freedom can
be secured only if diverse communities, organized in various towns and cities across the Nation, are
encouraged (and permitted) to govern themselves in accordance with a set of common principles that
they know to be more enduring than the preferences of any temporary majority.”); Poirier, supra note
239, at 976–77 (explaining Justice Kennedy’s decision in Windsor as motivated by the Defense of
Marriage Act’s blocking of “the piecemeal, checkerboard transitional process of states responding to
citizens’ evolving perceptions of human need and dignity,” and that the “whiffs of federalism” in
Windsor are rooted in the Court rejecting “the federal government[‘s] intru[sion] on the historic role of
the states”); Rosenthal, supra note 239, at 268–69 (positing that Romer stands for the proposition that “it
is irrational to deny local governments the power to address local problems, especially when it leaves a
discrete class in jeopardy of having their right to invoke generally applicable legal protections rendered
illusory”).
269. Poirier, supra note 239, at 977–78.
270. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City, supra note 30, at 548–49 (“If this framework accords
local governments a measure of freedom from intrusive judicial remedies that would impose
burdensome positive constitutional obligations upon them, it also accords them constitutional protection
against state attempts to prevent them from assuming such obligations when they believe it necessary to
do so.”).
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political institutions from promoting a norm of constitutional equality that lies
beyond direct judicial enforcement.”271
These cases therefore provide several different ways to think about and
challenge state action that burdens the ability of localities to protect the
constitutional rights of their citizens.272 However, the added layer of protection
against state incursion on local authority is unlikely to come into play with
regard to bag bans or other environmental issues. To be sure, laws at the state
level that target certain local actions may be motivated by animus or industry
interests.273 As in many other areas, local regulations on environmental issues
such as plastic bag bans are likely to pique the interest of industries that may be
affected by the regulation,274 and encourage those industries to seek redress at
the state level.275 In these fights, localities often lose out to special interests at
the state level, as they have much weaker lobbying influence.276 But while
environmental harms endanger humans,277 restrictions on environmental
protections do not touch on recognized individual liberties. Any inquiry under
the Equal Protection Clause, even under the slightly modified animus analysis,
will require definition of the burdened group and the rights being burdened.
Carving out a special class of persons is difficult in the environmental context,
where there is not a class of persons being singled out. Instead, the harm is
acted upon a natural resource,278 or, viewed another way, on the right of
citizens to develop policy solutions for a particular problem.279 In consequence,
claims invoking the Federal Equal Protection Clause to guard against state
271.
272.

Id. at 571.
Id. at 548–49 (explaining that the defense of local constitutionalism “proceeds . . . from a
structural conclusion that substantive constitutional rights sometimes presuppose the existence of a local
decision-making process capable of ensuring the protection of those rights”).
273. Cf. Roesler, supra note 2, at 1137 (“Because the benefits of environmental regulation are
diffuse . . . but the costs are concentrated in a given industry or group of industries, the political and
administrative processes are often dominated by industry interests.”).
274. Diller, supra note 2, at 1114 (noting that “[b]usiness and industry groups are the litigants who
most commonly assert preemption to block local policies that may impose additional costs and
regulatory burdens”).
275. See, e.g., Cleveland v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1072, 1085 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (describing
restaurant industry influence that led to passage of a state ban on local regulation of trans fats).
276. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, The Partly Fulfilled Promise of Home Rule in Oregon, 87 OR. L.
REV. 939, 966–67 (2008) (noting that “[t]he interest groups pushing for express preemption provisions
are often well-funded and well-organized,” while advocates for local authority may be less well-funded
and/or more susceptible to bargaining away local authority as part of legislative negotiations).
277. SHUTKIN, supra note 35, at 17.
278. Equal protection claims focused on harm to resources have been discussed, but have a low
likelihood of success. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: ProcessBased Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental
Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 407 (1997).
279. Where equal protection claims have arisen in the environmental context, it is generally in the
form of disparate impact claims. Disparate impact claims are highly fact-specific, however, and require
proof that a policy has produced a disproportionate harm upon a class of persons. While those impacts,
if manifested as a result of a ban on plastic bag bans, could potentially offer a means of challenging the
state action, such a strategy is unlikely to be available for a number of years, and is outside the
discussion of the home rule framework.
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revocation of local authority to act on environmental issues would likely be
rejected before any kind of analysis of state animus could be reached. Thus,
while the Equal Protection Clause provides some avenues around the home rule
analysis, it is likely difficult to apply in the context of local environmental
laws.280
C. State Environmental Protections
The possibly localist underpinnings of both the “shadow doctrine” of local
government law and the animus line of cases illustrate the ways in which
judges are involved in allocating state and local power. They also provide a
good example of how judges react when they are uncomfortable with the result
of the typical division of power. To date, similar kinds of reasoning have not
occurred in environmental law. The seemingly implacable nature of the
distribution of state and local power has stymied both courts and scholars from
combatting the targeted preemption of local environmental efforts.281
Nevertheless, the recent emergence of reactive state legislation may offer an
impetus for judges to more carefully examine possible bases for defending
local environmental protections. Outside of the home rule context, scholars
have recognized that where state constitutions establish a right to a clean
environment, state ability to forestall local action on an environmental issue
may be called into question.282 Even where state constitutional protections do
not exist, the public trust doctrine could potentially serve as a kind of canon of
construction in interpreting state action, thereby providing a basis for
environmental protection, or at least a barrier to environmental degradation.283
1. State Constitutional Provisions
A number of state constitutions include provisions that establish
environmental protections for their citizens. These provisions vary widely in
form and scope, and, like home rule provisions, their precise number and
parameters are difficult to assess.284 In general, these provisions do not impose

280. For many of the reasons described here, most attempts to use the Equal Protection Clause to
advance environmental justice have been similarly unsuccessful. See, e.g., Carlton Waterhouse,
Abandon All Hope Ye That Enter? Equal Protection, Title VI, and the Divine Comedy of Environmental
Justice, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 63–69 (2009).
281. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 177, at 376 (noting that courts’ consideration of preemption
questions in the fracking context have, to date, buried considerations involving the extent of home rule
powers “behind an ostensibly mechanical application of the statutory (and, where applicable,
constitutional) rules”).
282. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 278, at 438.
283. See William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 693, 703 (2012).
284. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 278, at 439 (“[A]pproximately two-thirds of state
constitutions . . . speak in some way to environmental concerns.”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27
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affirmative duties on a state,285 but establish limits on government action.286
Where these protections exist, the home rule analysis may be fairly simple.
Under either a constitutional or legislative home rule framework—or whether
looking for a state interest or general legislation—state actions may not
contravene the constitution. A constitutional right to a clean environment, or
whatever form the provision may take, therefore provides an extra layer of
protection for local action in support of that right.
This kind of protection was responsible for the result in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth.287 At
issue in that case was state legislation on natural gas drilling that included a
clause explicitly preempting all local ordinances governing such drilling. In
considering challenges to the state law, the court engaged in a thorough
discussion of Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment, which states
that:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the
people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people.288
The court recognized that localities had no inherent powers, and that the
Commonwealth had the authority to alter or remove power granted to local
governments.289 But it also acknowledged that “constitutional commands
regarding municipalities’ obligations and duties to their citizens cannot be
abrogated by statute.”290 The court found that the state scheme of voiding all
local regulations regarding fracking, and instead requiring local governments to
take measures to accommodate fracking as needed, forced localities to act in
contravention of the constitutional mandate. It further stated that “[t]he [state]
police power, broad as it may be, does not encompass [the] authority to . . .
fundamentally disrupt . . . expectations respecting the environment.” 291 Thus,
the court held that the portion of the state legislation preempting local law
making was improper. In the limited states like Pennsylvania that enshrine
environmental protection in the constitution, local governments may therefore
have a powerful tool to push back against state override.
RUTGERS L.J. 863, 867 (1996) (“Virtually all state constitutions contain one or more provisions
specifying environmental or natural resource policies; most include multiple provisions.”).
285. Thompson, supra note 284, at 896 (“[S]tate courts have never ordered a legislature to adopt a
particular environmental policy or program based on an environmental policy provision, even in those
states where the constitution appears to mandate legislative action.”).
286. See Araiza, supra note 278, at 446.
287. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
288. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
289. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 978.
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2. Public Trust Doctrine
Of course, not all state constitutions incorporate explicit protections of
environmental values. Even where these textual protections do not exist,292
there may be a path forward for courts to uphold local environmental
innovation in the face of contrary state authority. The public trust doctrine is a
much-discussed concept that may allow judges to push back on actions by the
state that undermine environmental values.293 Both the precise scope and the
legal foundation of the doctrine are still very much in flux, and heavily
debated.294 In short, the concept of the public trust states that certain
environmental and natural resources are held in trust for citizens by the
government.295 The principal trustee of those resources is the state
legislature,296 although trust responsibilities may in some states be delegated to
local governments. Originally focused on aquatic resources, some courts have
extended the modern public trust doctrine to a wider range of natural assets.297
Like the legal status of local government, the public trust doctrine is a
creation largely of the judiciary.298 Its more modern use is often tied to Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, an 1892 case in which the Supreme Court
confirmed “that the historic public trust doctrine was an independent limitation
on the state’s power to sell or otherwise relinquish control over submerged
lands that instead must always be held ‘in trust’ for the public.”299 Following
that case, and after the more recent revival of the doctrine by Professor Joseph
Sax’s seminal 1970 law review article on the subject,300 “courts have decided
hundreds of cases involving the public trust doctrine.”301 Nonetheless, its legal

292. As noted, state constitutional protections for the environment vary widely. Where such
protections exist, but are insufficient to support a finding of unconstitutionality, those provisions could
also operate in the ways suggested for the public trust doctrine in this Subpart, as a set of background
principles that could lend different meaning to the home rule analysis.
293. Cf. Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating
Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 713 (2006).
294. Joseph Sax famously revived the doctrine in 1970. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). It has
since been the subject of lively debates over its foundation and scope.
295. See, e.g., id. at 485–87.
296. MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 5–6 (2d ed. 2015).
297. See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 466 (1989).
298. See Sax, supra note 294, at 521 (“The ‘public trust’ has no life of its own and no intrinsic
content. It is no more—and no less—than a name courts give to their concerns about the insufficiencies
of the democratic process.”); see also Hope M. Babcock, The Public Trust Doctrine: What A Tall Tale
They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV. 393, 394 (2009); James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A
History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 1–2 (2007); Richard J. Lazarus,
Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust
Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 656 (1986).
299. See Klass, supra note 293, at 703.
300. Sax, supra note 294, at 471.
301. Klass, supra note 293, at 707.
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foundations remain unsettled and the doctrine has long been subject to debate
as to how far its limits extend, and how and when it should be applied.302
Indeed, the popularity of the doctrine among environmental advocates may be
due in large part to its malleability.303 What many theories regarding the public
trust have in common, however, is the recognition of a duty on the part of the
state to “manage trust resources for broad public benefit” and to “consider the
public trust before taking action that may adversely affect trust resources.”304
At the outset, it should be noted that in states with well-defined,
enforceable public trust doctrines that expand beyond the traditional scope of
navigable waters, an analysis could potentially proceed in much the same way
as it would in the instance of constitutional protections. That is, a party could
potentially challenge a state law as violating the public trust doctrine, and under
either a constitutional or legislative home rule framework, an invalid state law
would not override local law-making abilities. However, given the lack of
concrete public trust principles in most states, it seems likely that the doctrine is
more appropriately used as an aid in understanding competing state and local
authority in the home rule system.305 This conception of the public trust may
leave open the possibility for a judge to overturn reactive state legislation that
eliminates local ability to advance environmental values.
Scholars have advanced a range of proposals for how the public trust
obligation might manifest itself. These proposals run the gamut from calls for
the public trust to impose an affirmative duty on the state, to those viewing the
public trust as more of a background principle of property law. Operating at the
latter end of that spectrum, Professor William Araiza has suggested a means by
which the public trust doctrine might move beyond its historic aquatic
underpinnings while circumventing criticism that such an expansion lacks
doctrinal foundation and inappropriately upsets the separation of powers
between branches.306 Professor Araiza suggests that the public trust doctrine
may be available to judges not as a doctrine with legally binding effects, but as
a canon of construction, or a “background principle against which positive

302. Id. at 699 (“Throughout its existence, the public trust doctrine has been pulled in different
directions and assigned different meanings.”); see, e.g., BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 296, at 3–10
(discussing who the trustees and beneficiaries of the public trust doctrine should be, and different
applications of the doctrine); Lazarus, supra note 298, at 631.
303. John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles Defense in
Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 951 (2012).
304. Id.; see also J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green Property: A
Future Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 915, 916 (2012) (describing the public trust doctrine as
protecting public use and public interest).
305. Cf. Araiza, supra note 283, at 699 (explaining that “[m]uch of the justification for suggesting
that we understand the [public trust] doctrine as a canon of construction rests on the lack of a steady
legal foundation for an ‘amphibian’ public trust doctrine”); Sax, supra note 294, at 521 (“The ‘public
trust’ has no life of its own and no intrinsic content. It is no more—and no less—than a name courts give
to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic process.”).
306. See generally Araiza, supra note 283, at 697.
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legislation and administrative actions are construed and reviewed.”307 Under
this theory, courts could construe state legislative action that threatened values
of the public trust “against the backdrop of a commitment to the protection of
those values.”308
As noted, courts in a number of cases have, where motivated by principles
that support local control of an issue, created a sort of “shadow doctrine”
upholding local authority in the face of state assertions of control.309 It is
difficult—and, as noted, contrary to much of environmental law and
advocacy—to advance an argument that localities deserve deference in general
for environmental policy making. The use of the public trust doctrine as an
interpretive mechanism may, however, offer support to localities where state
action would undermine or run contrary to advancement of the public trust.
Under such a theory, the public trust doctrine would not itself alter the home
rule analysis. Instead, it could provide a basis for a judicial finding of protected
local values in need of vindication. Targeted elimination of local authority
unaccompanied by action at the state level creates obstacles to action on
environmental issues and impedes actions in furtherance of the trust resources
of the state. Courts reviewing state action that invalidates local ability to act on
environmental matters may find that public trust principles support a right to
local innovation on such issues. This kind of application of the public trust
doctrine would not dictate a substantive outcome, or require affirmative action
by the state. But it would find that public trust principles operate as a check on
state authority, and that a state cannot put up a wall against advancement of
public trust values by localities. The suggested use of the public trust in this
manner does not yet appear to have been applied; nevertheless, courts may be
able to “act creatively” to vindicate public trust principles.310 The next Part
incorporates these ideas into the realm of state and local government relations.
Using bans on bag bans as an example, it argues that state constitutional
protections and the public trust doctrine may justify judicial support of local
innovation on environmental protection.
VI. CASE STUDY: RETHINKING BANS ON BAG BANS
This Article has previously made clear both that (1) the environmental
harms of plastic bags may lead to local bans, and (2) home rule precedent
leaves open the door for judges to construe state power liberally. Nothing
proposed herein can be said to provide absolute support for local autonomy.
But this Part employs the above analysis to propose a path forward for judges

307.
308.
309.

Id.
Id. at 714.
FRUG, supra note 14, at 51 (“[T]he immunization of city decision making from state control is
possible only if courts have a strong sense that the local values being advanced outweigh the state’s
determination to protect the individual interests involved.”).
310. Araiza, supra note 283, at 720.
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who, confronted with reactive, targeted incursions on local solutions, see fit to
infuse the traditional analysis of state action with layers of environmental
protection. To the extent they exist, state constitutional provisions may provide
a basis for finding state laws improper at the outset. And even where such
provisions are not as straightforward or easily applied, permutations of the
public trust doctrine may establish a basis for courts to bring a more
environmentally friendly home rule analysis out of the shadows.
A. Application of State Constitutional Provisions
Where they exist, state constitutional provisions protecting a right to a
clean environment could support a locality’s power to develop initiatives—
such as bans on bag bans—in support of that right. As noted, bag bans are
intended to address environmental harms like impaired water and landscape
pollution. Any locality claiming protection under the state constitution would
likely need to demonstrate the extent of those harms. For instance, under the
Pennsylvania Constitution, local governments would have to show that
overriding state prohibitions on bag bans undermines the “natural, scenic,
historic and esthetic values of the environment.”311 To do this, local
governments could potentially draw on studies of localized impacts of bag
pollution, like one in Washington, D.C. that illustrated the extent of trash
pollution from disposable plastic bags in the Anacostia River, and served as the
justification for passage of the D.C. bag tax.312 Upon such a showing, a ban on
the ability of localities to combat pollution might be seen as a constitutional
violation by the state.313 While these provisions would not impose any kind of
affirmative obligation on the part of the state, they could potentially protect the
right to local policy making in support of trust resources. Regardless of whether
a state has a legislative or constitutional home rule system, or even a home rule

311. PA. CONST. art 1, § 27. The showing required will necessarily vary by state and by
constitutional language.
312. See Purpose and Impact of the Bag Law, D.C. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENV’T, https://doee.
dc.gov/service/purpose-and-impact-bag-law (last visited July 3, 2017); see also ANACOSTIA
WATERSHED SOC’Y, ANACOSTIA WATERSHED TRASH REDUCTION PLAN xv (2008), https://doee.dc.
gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ddoe/publication/attachments/2009.01.29_Trash_Report_1.pdf
(noting
that “[t]he single largest component of trash in the streams, and most likely in the river, [was] plastic
bags,” and that legislation eliminating the use of free plastic bags would “effectively remove 47% of the
trash from the tributaries and 21% from the main stem of the river”).
313. The exact parameters of this analysis will necessarily differ based on the grant of authority, as
the types of constitutional grants of environmental protection vary widely. See Araiza, supra note 278, at
439 (describing seven types of state constitutional provisions that speak to environmental concerns, in
order from weakest to strongest protection afforded the environment: “(1) authorizations for legislative
action (normally for preservation activities or the contracting of indebtedness to pay for preservation);
(2) creation of a decision-making body charged with resource preservation; (3) creation of a trust fund or
other funding mechanism for preservation purposes; (4) broad statements of a state’s pro-preservation
policy or directions to the legislature to protect certain resources; (5) restrictions on the legislature’s
power to alienate certain resources; (6) establishment of certain resources as the public domain; and (7)
conferrals of a right to a clean environment on individuals”).
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system at all, state laws may not contravene the state constitution. As
demonstrated in Robinson Township, and, to some degree in Romer and
Windsor, state limits on local experimentation in support of a constitutional
goal may be deemed unconstitutional.314 If so, there would be no need to
address the home rule framework. Under such an analysis, state bans on bag
bans would fail as a matter of constitutional law.
B. Application of the Public Trust Doctrine
Taking Arizona’s treatment of bag bans as a case study, this Article makes
a first attempt at applying the public trust doctrine as an interpretive tool for
defending local environmental measures from state legislation. Arizona
recognizes the public trust doctrine,315 and the scope of that doctrine is
determined by the judiciary.316 Most formally, the public trust doctrine in
Arizona “restricts the sovereign’s ability to dispose of resources held in public
trust.”317 Arizona courts have expressly stated, however, that the public trust is
not necessarily limited to a state’s traditional interest in land under water.318 It
is therefore possible to consider how the public trust may come into play where
the state legislature attempts to halt local environmental efforts.
Where a state restricts local ability to ban bag ordinances, or to impose
fees on bags, the analysis of whether this elimination of local authority was in
line with the state’s home rule delegation would typically look only to whether
the state prohibition was a general law, or one impacting state concern. Under
either analysis, the state prohibition would likely be upheld. Where the public
trust doctrine acts as a “thumb on the scale in favor of the public trust
value,”319 however, the outcome could potentially be different. By
incorporating public trust values into the home rule framework, courts may
have a legitimate role in balancing politics between city and state, and
maintaining environmental protection as the constant. In this way, the use of
the doctrine is consistent with Joseph Sax’s original statement that “public trust
law is not so much a substantive set of standards for dealing with the public
domain as it is a technique by which courts may mend perceived imperfections
in the legislative and administrative process.”320
314.
315.

See supra Parts V.B, V.C.1.
See, e.g., Klass, supra note 293, at 732–33 (discussing Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest
v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) and San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Cnty.
of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999)).
316. Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 WL 1091209, at *5 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013) (It is “within the power of the judiciary to determine the threshold question of
whether a particular resource is a part of the public trust subject to the [d]octrine.”).
317. Id. at *3.
318. Id. at *6.
319. Araiza, supra note 283, at 719.
320. See Sax, supra note 294, at 509. Notably, Professor Sax thought that one of these
imperfections was decision making at too local a level in matters of statewide concern. But Sax’s
general idea that the public trust doctrine serves to correct for imbalances that would result in
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This approach may be vulnerable to the same kinds of critiques that have
long been aimed at expansions of the public trust doctrine beyond its historic
roots. For instance, the public trust is often criticized as a counter-majoritarian
measure by courts overriding the will of the people, or as a judge-made
doctrine lacking in legal foundation. But where, as in the approach suggested
here, judges are merely weighing whether one branch of government should
have the ability to put an end to experimentation by another, concerns about
override of the popular will may be less substantial. And while it is perhaps not
a satisfying answer to critics of the legitimacy of the public trust’s foundations
to say that the use of the public trust doctrine in this capacity is merely another
example of judicial willingness to uphold local authority in certain instances, it
is nonetheless true. Upholding local experimentation in support of the
environmental resources of citizens is in keeping with the long tradition of the
judiciary sorting out the extent of the power of the state. The ideas surrounding
the public trust provide a reasoned basis on which that tradition may continue
in environmental law.
1. Public Trust in Constitutional Home Rule States
As discussed, Arizona’s home rule system is based on a constitutional
grant of authority. The validity of any state law’s infringement on local
authority under a constitutional home rule framework is likely to turn on
whether the subject of the law in question is of “substantial state concern.”321 If
it is, the law is likely to be upheld. Courts tend to give a liberal construction to
what constitutes a “genuine state concern,” and often allow state laws to
override local law making. Thus, for instance, Arizona courts could find that
the question of how best to conduct pollution control, or to create uniform
business standards, is a matter of statewide concern.322 If that were the case,
then a ban on bag bans would be an appropriate subject for state legislation and
the state statute would be upheld. While the extent to which state and local
provisions conflict is often a subject of debate, in this example there is no
question—local prohibition on bags directly conflicts with the state revocation
of authority. And in that circumstance, the state law prevails.323 Local bag bans
would therefore be invalidated.
The public trust doctrine could, however, potentially act as a “thumb on
the scale” in favor of local authority that is generally absent from this
analysis.324 The need for uniform business regulations, and mere state
environmentally harmful outcomes may argue in favor of using the doctrine to uphold local action that
results in net environmental protection.
321. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 28.
322. See, e.g., Humphrey v. City of Phoenix, 102 P.2d 82, 88 (Ariz. 1940) (noting that keeping
cities “in sanitary and safe condition is essential to the health, morals and general welfare of the whole
state”).
323. Prendergast v. City of Tempe, 691 P.2d 726, 729 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
324. See Araiza, supra note 283, at 719.
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assertions of this interest, would likely be sufficient in a typical analysis to
uphold the state statute. However, both state and local governments in many
states have a genuine interest in the furtherance of values of the public trust.325
Those values cannot be abrogated by or rejected in favor of competing
interests. A judge assessing whether the state deserves deference on pollution
control strategies may view that question differently where the state is under an
obligation to uphold public trust values. Viewing the public trust as a canon
that counsels against the undermining of trust resources, a court could decide to
give more weight to the outcome that would better protect these resources. A
judge reviewing the state statute could potentially find that there is no genuine
state interest in action that would undermine the trust, or that would prevent
localities from policy experimentation that would advance their interest in
preserving and maintaining trust resources.
Without public trust principles, or a reason to uphold local action, such a
finding is unlikely; with them, judges may find a legal basis on which to
premise a decision in support of local authority. Such a construction would
allow for emphasis on the local interest in maintaining the quality of local
waterways and surrounding lands. For instance, advocates in South Carolina
pushing for local control over bag bans have noted that plastic bags
inappropriately recycled can destroy machinery at municipal recycling facilities
or contaminate municipal compost, and those otherwise discarded can strangle
marine life and degrade into tiny fragments that pollute waterways.326 As
discussed previously, cities like Washington, D.C. have also engaged in
detailed studies of plastic bag pollution that clearly demonstrate the localized
impact of bags, and the potential benefits of a bag ban.327 And other cities have
documented the huge cost involved in cleaning up, recycling, and disposing of
plastic bags.328 While these harms are not undisputed,329 the concrete,

325. The scope of the public trust doctrine is a matter of state law. See Thomas W. Merrill, The
Public Trust Doctrine: Some Jurisprudential Variations and Their Implications, 38 U. HAW. L. REV.
261, 261 (2016). Thus, the extent to which local governments have an ability to exercise authority in the
interest of the public trust will depend on state law. See, e.g., Sid Ansbacher & Susan Cobb Grandin,
Local Government Riparian Rights and Authority, FLA. B.J., June 1996, at 87 (describing public trust
duty of local governments in Florida); Lee A. Kaplan, Whose Coast Is It Anyway? Climate Change,
Shoreline Armoring, and the Public’s Right to Access the California Coast, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl.
Law Inst.) 10,971, 10,979 (2016) (describing a unique feature of North Carolina state law that “forbids
municipalities from asserting the public trust doctrine,” and distinguishing California state law, where
local governments are responsible for implementing various aspects of the public trust doctrine); John
Quick, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin, 1 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 111 (1994)
(describing limitations on the ability of local governments to act under the public trust umbrella pursuant
to Wisconsin state law).
326. See Project: Plastic Pollution, COASTAL CONSERVATION LEAGUE, http://coastalconservation
league.org/projects/plastic-pollution/ (last visited July 3, 2017).
327. See supra note 312.
328. See, e.g., Russo & Myers, supra note 182 (citing a San Jose report that “estimates that to
clean up, recycle and landfill” plastic bags costs 17 cents per bag).
329. Id.
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localized pollution that plastic bags contribute to water and land would support
a finding of a local interest in regulating those bags.
A judge employing the public trust doctrine could take a more skeptical
eye to any claim by the state to having a countervailing interest in a lack of
regulation of this issue. Without that state interest, there would be no
justification for superseding local regulations. The public trust approach could
therefore avoid state elimination of the ability to advance environmental
protections unaccompanied by state action on the issue. In this way, the home
rule doctrine itself could be infused with public trust or environmental
protection principles. Nothing in this analysis would create an affirmative
obligation on the part of the state to take action to prevent pollution of the
resources at issue here—in the bag ban context, state land and waterways. It
may, however, prevent targeted removals by the state of a locality’s ability to
uphold the environmental interests of its citizens, including, in the bag ban
context, clean water for irrigation, recreation, and drinking, as well as
enjoyment of unpolluted landscapes and wildlife. In other contexts, such
interests could extend to clean air, protection from flooding, and a variety of
others.
This proposal and analysis is admittedly general, and open to ad hoc
determinations in the way that individual judges weigh state and local interests.
That unbounded analysis is characteristic of both the home rule and public trust
doctrines. Judges have substantial leeway in defining cognizable state interests,
and in allocating power between state and local governments. The principles
behind the public trust doctrine could similarly play a background role in
justifying the judiciary’s action in halting state legislation that targets local
authority. That could make a critical distinction in the way that courts think
about local authority. It could also provide an avenue for challenging state
action that undermines environmental values or that is motivated by animus
toward a set of progressive policies. In this way, this strategy could provide a
way out from the typical deference to state authority in instances of explicit
removal of local authority over environmental issues. The approach set out here
would likely not apply where the state itself has advanced a competing
regulatory system for handling an environmental issue. It also would not
support local authority on parochial policies that undermine public trust values.
Instead, the doctrine would highlight the legal significance of state divestment
of local authority to pursue environmental goals. While the vagueness of this
theory means that the analysis employed would necessarily vary by state, it also
means that it is broad enough to encompass many sets of circumstances.330

330. See Araiza, supra note 283, at 718 (noting that “[t]he very idea of a penumbral canon
protecting a broad but vague underlying legal value necessarily implies some vagueness with regard to
the canon’s operational scope”).
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2. Public Trust in Legislative Home Rule States
The public trust as modifier of what constitutes a genuine state concern is
unlikely to have an impact for cities operating under grants of legislative home
rule. For these cities, the operative question is instead whether the state law at
issue constitutes general legislation. If so, it may be upheld without employing
any analysis of the state interest involved. The public trust doctrine may have a
role to play in the determination of general versus special legislation as well.
Typically, a general law is simply defined as one that equally impacts all
cities within a class. Infusing this analysis with public trust principles may
create an opportunity for a different outcome where state action undermines
environmental goals.
In Cleveland v. State, an Ohio Court of Appeals struck down a state statute
disallowing municipal bans on certain foods such as those containing trans
fats.331 Ohio appears to have one of the most precise definitions in the country
regarding what constitutes a general law, and employs a four-part test.332 As
part of the court’s assessment of the validity of the state statute, one of the
factors it had to consider was whether the state ban had uniform application
throughout the state.333 The statute in question applied on its face to all parts of
the state, but addressed only food service operations and not retail food
establishments.334 The difference in coverage led the court to find that the law
did not have uniform application and, for this and other reasons, was therefore
invalid.335 While the court decided the question of uniformity on that basis, it
also described an argument from amici participants that “any state law . . .
which prevents individual municipalities from acting to address food based
health disparities resulting from local social, demographic, environmental and
geographic attributes inevitably impacts different parts of the state in a nonuniform manner.”336 The parties did not address this issue, and it did not form
the basis of the court’s decision, but the court nevertheless “f[ound] some merit
in this argument.”337
The public trust doctrine may be able to encourage a similar kind of
analysis even in states that do not employ Ohio’s test for general legislation.
Under a typical analysis, a court’s determination of whether something
constitutes a general law is limited to identifying the class to which the law

331.
332.
333.

Cleveland v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1072, 1087 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 1080.
Much of the court’s analysis was shaped by the fact that, under Ohio law, “[a] statute does not
qualify as a general law if it merely restricts the ability of a municipality to enact legislation.” Id. at
1082. This rule does not appear to have been adopted anywhere else in the country. If adopted widely,
however, such a standard would create a much clearer limit on the ability of state legislatures to pass
reactive laws targeting local governments.
334. Id. at 1082.
335. Id. at 1082–83.
336. Id. at 1082 n.1.
337. Id.
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applies, and assessing whether the application is uniform within the class. As in
Cleveland, the exemption of a large category of actors may prevent a finding of
uniform application.338 But where, as in the case of Arizona’s ban on bag bans,
the law applies to all cities and counties in the state, the law is likely to be
found facially uniform. A public trust lens may help the disparate impacts of
state prohibitions on local action come into sharp relief. If states remove local
authority without taking action on the state level to address the environmental
needs of concerned communities, then some local governments may not be able
to uphold their public trust obligations. A state law such as Arizona’s
prohibition on bag bans therefore disadvantages cities that are attempting to
protect trust resources through bag bans. It may also be viewed as conferring a
special advantage in terms of advancing public trust values upon those
localities that may be in less need of such a ban.339 While the public trust
doctrine is unlikely to create affirmative obligations with regard to
environmental protections, it may help to give the lie to purportedly uniform
actions by the state that instead target actions by certain cities. In this way, the
public trust doctrine may empower courts to push back against reactive state
legislation.
CONCLUSION
As noted, the home rule system took a variety of forms as it spread across
the nation. At its core, though, is recognition that piecemeal local governance
undermines the ability of cities to respond to the concerns of their citizens.
Targeted state removal of local authority to act to protect the environment
undermines democratic ideals and prevents useful experimentation.340 It also
has the potential to reduce participation in local government, as citizens feel
that their choices are not valued.341 In this way, state revocation of local
authority may “not only prevent cities from experimenting in democratic forms
of organization,” but may “make experiments seem less appealing.”342 There is
important environmental work currently being done by cities,343 and a great

338.
339.

See id. at 1082.
Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen’s Found., 637 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Ariz. 1981) (“Equal
protection is denied when the state unreasonably discriminates against a person or class. Prohibited
special legislation, on the other hand, unreasonably and arbitrarily discriminates in favor of a person or
class by granting them a special or exclusive immunity, privilege, or franchise.”).
340. Cf. KRANE ET AL., supra note 71, at 7 (noting that the public choice model of federalism rests
on several assumptions, including that “local government officials are responsive to the preferences of
the local citizenry, local governments possess adequate powers by which to respond to citizen
preferences, and local government activities are the product of local citizen choices as reflected through
the policy decisions of local officials and do not reflect the policy decisions of some other body of
government (that is, state government)”).
341. See, e.g., van de Biezenbos, supra note 114, at 1670 (“The overuse of state preemption to
overrule local authority undermines citizens’ faith in the democratic process.”).
342. FRUG, supra note 14, at 23.
343. Supra Part I.
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need for that work to continue into the future. The ability of states to remove
the authority to act on issues at the city level while perpetuating inaction at the
state level is therefore concerning.
This Article does not intend to send to the courts what is more properly the
job of the legislature. The public trust doctrine or other judge-made doctrines
should not replace the hard work of governance and creation of good rules at
the legislative level.344 An approach more desirable than the one proposed here
may be for state legislatures to amend home rule provisions to prevent
reactionary revocation of local authority by the state legislature.345 By carving
out a more certain piece of authority for localities, states could help prepare
their communities for the coming decades in which cities are likely to confront
a new set of environmental issues. Until that occurs, however,346 upholding
local ability to act will likely be the purview of the courts. It is easy for
environmental issues to be undervalued in the political process,347 and for
movement on those issues to be undermined by the state legislature. It is
unlikely that the same legislatures that are undermining environmental values
will make changes that would curtail their authority over local action. If courts
do not take action in support of cities, there is a real potential for harm to
environmental progress.
There may, of course, be other ways for localities and private parties to
achieve environmental progress within the constraints of home rule. On the
plastic bag front, retailers could choose not to stock plastic bags, or they could
choose to offer incentives to customers for using reusable containers. For
instance, Whole Foods stores give customers up to a ten-cent discount for each
reusable bag brought for grocery shopping.348 More generally, it has been
suggested that cities may also be able to incorporate existing state
environmental protections instead of fashioning their own restrictions on
344. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the Public
Trust Doctrine: Can Two Wrongs Make It Right?, 45 ENVTL. L. 1139 (2015).
345. See, e.g., FRUG & BARRON, supra note 6, at 23 (noting that it is likely that “[r]eformation of
the state legal structure must . . . be the primary means by which city power is enhanced”). The test
created by Ohio courts for determining whether something is “general” or “special” legislation could
serve as a potential model for such an amendment. See, e.g., Cleveland v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2013).
346. A recent ballot initiative in Colorado illustrates the challenges of such legislative change. In
Colorado, Initiative 89 proposed, among other things, an amendment to the state constitution that
“authorize[d] local governments to enact ‘laws, regulations, ordinances, and charter provisions that
[we]re more restrictive and protective of the environment’ than the laws enacted by the state. This
proposed subsection also state[d] that if a local law conflict[ed] with state law, the more restrictive and
protective law govern[ed].” In re Title, Ballot Title, & Submission Clause for 2013–2014 #89, 328 P.3d
172, 175 (Colo. 2014). In a development that may show the difficulty in passing such legislation, the
Initiative was later dropped as part of a settlement with the governor and oil and gas companies. See,
e.g., Colorado Ballot Initiatives 88, 89 Pulled Today, OIL & GAS 360 (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.oilandgas360.com/colorado-ballot-initiatives-88-89-pulled-today/.
347. See Araiza, supra note 283, at 717.
348. Joseph Pisani, Retailers Paying Customers to Bring Their Own Bags, CNBC (Oct. 23, 2009,
2:31 PM).
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use,349 or to employ Business Improvement Districts or other special districts
that are outside the reach of traditional home rule laws. These options do not,
however, get at the heart of the question of when and how state law makers
may strike down local environmental legislation. State constitutional
protections, and the public trust doctrine, could justify a clearer judicial
doctrine on state removal of local authority on environmental issues.
To reiterate, local power over environmental issues is unlikely to be an
unalloyed good.350 Cities, or neighborhoods, may act in parochial ways that
prevent progress on environmental topics.351 But, in the past, cities have
experimented with governance in ways that have eventually created positive
change at the state and national level.352 In this way, “[c]ities have served and
might again serve as vehicles for the achievement of purposes that have been
frustrated in modern American life,” and might provide the ability “to
participate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect one’s life.”353 It is
the hope of many that they can play the same role in responding to a number of
pressing environmental needs.354 The home rule framework was designed to
ensure that cities would have the ability to respond to their rapidly changing
needs. By infusing home rule with an updated understanding of government
obligations toward the environment, it may come a bit closer to achieving that
goal.

349. See van de Biezenbos, supra note 114, at 1659–63 (“Contracting with the state environmental
agency is an option with several advantages over creating a local enforcement program.”).
350. See Barron, supra note 30, at 2268–70 (explaining the theory that local power leads to
perpetuation of suburban sprawl); Briffault, supra note 222, at 1–2 (associating local control with
parochial behaviors).
351. See, e.g., id.; see also Frank Witsil & Eric D. Lawrence, RTA Millage Rejected by Metro
Detroit Voters, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 9, 2016, 9:15 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/
local/michigan/detroit/2016/11/09/rta-regional-transit-authority-millage/93535602/ (noting how voters
in the Detroit suburbs rejected the city’s new transit plan).
352. See Michèle Finck, The Role of Localism in Constitutional Change: A Case Study, 30 J.L. &
POL. 53, 54 (2014).
353. FRUG, supra note 14, at 20.
354. DOUGLAS, supra note 27, at 308.
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online
companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu. Responses to
articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.ecologylawquarterly.org.
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